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Abstract
We quantify the causal effect of foreign investment on total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) using a new global firm-level database. Our identification strategy
relies on exploiting the difference in the amount of foreign investment by finan-
cial and industrial investors and simultaneously controlling for unobservable
firm and country-sector-year factors. Using our well identified firm level esti-
mates for the direct effect of foreign ownership on acquired firms and for the
spillover effects on domestic firms, we calculate the aggregate impact of foreign
investment on country-level productivity growth and find it to be very small.
JEL: E32, F15, F36, O16.
Keywords: Multinationals, FDI, Knowledge Spillovers, Selection, Productivity.
∗Affiliations: Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics; Uni-
versity of Maryland, CEPR, and NBER; University of Houston and CEPR; ESADE - Universitat
Ramon Llull; Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute and Erasmus Research Institute
of Management (ERIM). Carolina Villegas-Sanchez acknowledges financial support from Banco
Sabadell. We thank Galina Hale, Alessandra Bonfiglioli, and participants in seminars at the follow-
ing universities and conferences: Trinity College Dublin, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University
of Zurich, University of Connecticut, NIPE Universidade do Minho, the CEPR Macroeconomics of
Global Interdependence Conference, the 2012 NBER Summer Institute, the 2012 AEA Meetings,
Dynamics, Economic Growth and the International Trade (DEGIT - XVII) Conference.
1 Introduction
A key feature of globalization is the increase in the flows of foreign direct investment
(FDI) to both developed countries and emerging markets. What is the effect of such
investment on aggregate productivity growth? Policy makers assume the effect on
country growth will be significant due to expected spillovers from multinationals
and their subsidiaries to domestic firms in the host country in the form of superior
technology and organizational practices. As a result there has been an extensive
policy push to increase FDI at the expense of debt as the major source of exter-
nal financing in the last two decades, which makes the effect of FDI on aggregate
productivity a first order question to investigate.
Macro-level studies generally document a positive correlation between country-
level growth and FDI flows,1 while micro-level studies document that multinationals
outperform domestic firms.2 Unfortunately, both literatures face severe identifica-
tion problems. At the macro-level, changes in the volume of FDI almost always
coincide with macroeconomic policy reforms, making it hard to identify the effect
of those flows from the effect of the policy reforms. At the firm-level most FDI
takes the form of acquisitions rather than greenfield investment, making it difficult
to know if a positive correlation between FDI and productivity is due to foreign
firms causing productivity increases or foreign firms spotting firms which have good
growth prospects whether they receive FDI or not.3 Since firms select themselves
into becoming exporters and multinationals (see Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz,
and Yeaple (2004)), multinationals that engage in FDI are likely to be highly pro-
ductive and likely to buy local firms with relatively high productivity and high
1In general, the positive correlation found at the macro-level between FDI and economic growth
is conditional on some threshold level of human capital and financial development in the country;
see Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004), Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998)
and Villegas-Sanchez (2010).
2Caves (1996), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Guadalupe,
Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012).
390% of FDI is conducted through acquisitions according to Barba-Navaretti and Venables
(2004), which provides an excellent survey of the literature.
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future growth potential. Hence, the positive selection at the firm-level must be
accounted for through controlling both unobserved firm-specific factors and firm’s
future growth potential.
Entry of multinationals may also affect the average productivity of domestic
firms even in the absence of productivity effects on acquired firms: research has
found a “business-stealing” effect leading to potential exit of domestic firms (nega-
tive selection) due to more intense competition for factors of production or market
shares.4 At the same time, it is also possible that domestic firms in sector which
receive substantial amounts of FDI become more productive due to spillovers from
foreign-owned firms. To pin down such potential effects, we have to account for exit,
competition and knowledge spillover effects together with sector-level selection; that
is, why FDI was more attracted to certain sectors in the first place.
Our unique world-wide panel of firm-level data allows us to get around these iden-
tification challenges and enables us to produce well-identified firm-level estimates for
the productivity gains from FDI. Our approach is straightforward. To control for
firm- and sector-specific selection, we use sector-time and firm fixed effects, which
account for fixed firm factors and all time varying changes in a sector or country that
attract multinationals, such as better location, policy reform, or broad technological
innovation. To account for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-sector-time level,
we use our unique information on investors’ identity to construct exogenous instru-
ments. Our identification rests on the difference between foreign financial investors
(banks, hedge-funds, mutual-funds) and foreign industrial investors (manufactur-
ing firms) investing in the same domestic sector. Financial investors typically hold
smaller stakes for earnings and diversification and do not actively manage their
targets. Industrial investors typically attempt to improve the productivity and
profitability of their investment targets by merging production units, marketing,
research, etc. We call the former type of investment “financial FDI” and the latter
4See Aitken and Harrison (1999); Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj (2011); Bloom, Schankerman,
and Van Reenen (2013).
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type “industrial FDI.” The observation that both industrial and financial FDI is at-
tracted by growth prospects in a given sector but only industrial foreign ownership
causes productivity growth allows us to construct an instrument which identifies the
causal effect of foreign ownership on productivity. More precisely, our identifying
assumption is that the amount of industrial FDI which is orthogonal to financial
FDI is exogenous to TFP growth.
Our data comes from the ORBIS database (compiled by Bureau van Dijk Elec-
tronic Publishing, BvD) and covers 60 countries worldwide, developed and emerg-
ing. The data set has financial accounting information from detailed harmonized
balance-sheets of target companies, their investors, and non-acquired companies. It
also provides the amount of foreign investment together with the type and country of
origin of the investor. The dataset is crucially different from the other data sets that
are commonly-used in the literature such as COMPUSTAT for the United States,
Compustat Global, and Worldscope databases in that 99 percent of the companies
in ORBIS are private, whereas the former popular data sets mainly contain informa-
tion on large listed companies. A fundamental advantage is the detailed ownership
information provided encompassing over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary “links.”
Foreign investment is not usually in the form of 100 percent ownership. We
know the percentage of foreign ownership and therefore we can explore heterogeneity
in foreign investment. Given the possibility that such heterogeneity may interact
with heterogeneity in total factor productivity,5 it is important to know the exact
amount of investment. Due to data availability, the literature most often uses a
dummy variable which indicates whether the firm is owned by an “overseas” entity
in the amount of more than a certain percent; see, for example, Bloom, Sadun, and
Van Reenen (2009), Keller and Yeaple (2009) and Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter
(2007). Other papers use 100 percent foreign-owned subsidiaries of multinationals;
see, for example, Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2007) and Alfaro and Chen (2012).
5Syverson (2011) finds a very wide range of productivity levels across firms.
4
Neither case will give a full description of heterogeneity in multinational investment.6
We first ask whether foreign-owned firms become more productive with increased
foreign ownership; that is, we estimate dynamic relations with foreign ownership
growth and productivity growth (for brevity, “difference regressions”). The liter-
ature has only found a positive correlation between the level of productivity and
level of foreign ownership and not between changes in productivity and changes in
foreign ownership. To put it differently, upon inclusion of firm fixed effects (or, alter-
natively, estimating growth-on-growth), no relation between FDI and productivity
has been uncovered (see Aitken and Harrison (1999); Javorcik (2004); Liu (2008)).7
Allowing for firm fixed effects, we find that foreign owned firms/multinational affili-
ates are more productive both in developed and emerging countries; however, using
Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation, we show that this effect is driven mainly by
investors cherry-picking firms with high future growth potential.
Second, we ask whether domestic firms (with zero foreign ownership) operat-
ing in the same sector as foreign affiliates become more productive with increased
foreign presence? The spillover literature aggregates firm-level FDI to the sectoral
level and tests for potential productivity spillovers to domestic firms in the same
or vertically-linked sectors. It finds negative horizontal spillovers in emerging coun-
tries and positive horizontal spillovers in developed countries, and positive verti-
cal spillovers (between two-digit upstream and downstream sectors) in both sets of
countries. The explanation has been that negative competition and business stealing
6Exceptions are Javorcik (2004), Aitken and Harrison (1999), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009),
who use firm-level ownership shares. Their samples are limited to firms from single countries.
7Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012) did not use fixed-
effects estimation, but instead employed propensity-score matching to deal with this “cherry-
picking” behavior, and find a positive effect of foreign investment on productivity. We believe
the differences in results are due to differences in estimation techniques and variables. Arnold and
Javorcik (2009) investigate FDI effects on plants but, as shown by Lileeva and Trefler (2010), the
average effect on a firm might be nil if some plants are affected and some are not. Our data is
at the firm level and, therefore, our results are not directly comparable with Arnold and Javorcik
(2009). Firm headquarters receive investments and allocate funds to certain plants. Guadalupe,
Kuzmina, and Thomas (2012) investigate the effect on labor productivity, while we solely focus on
total factor productivity.
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effects in the same “horizontal” sectors are relatively more pronounced in emerging
countries. The existing literature does not explicitly control for sector-time trends
and shocks because it focuses on a single country at a time. To identify spillover
effects, controlling for sector-year influences, is of a first-order importance for allevi-
ating selection concerns because we try to trace the productivity impact of sectoral
foreign presence on domestic firms. Typically, sectoral foreign presence is corre-
lated with other sector-year events and, thus, potential alternative determinants of
productivity, which can only be controlled for in the multi-country samples.
We find negative horizontal spillovers for both developed and emerging countries.
To dig deeper, we take advantage of our relatively fine four-digit firm classification
and investigate spillovers within two digit sectors. We interpret spillovers to closely
related firms as competition effects and spillovers to less closely related firms as
knowledge transmission. “Knowledge spillovers,” in our sense, are different from
vertical knowledge spillovers which are usually defined as spillovers between two-
digit downstream sectors such as, for example, car manufacturers and electricity
producers. Our knowledge spillovers are true “intra-industry” knowledge spillovers
within the same two digit sector but different four digit sector, for example, between
car manufacturers and car part producers.
We find evidence of positive spillovers from foreign activity only for developed
countries when we look at domestic firms which are not direct competitors of the
foreign firms (in the same two-digit, but different four-digit sector). We further
demonstrate that these effects are concentrated among relatively more productive
domestic firms. We do not find such effects for emerging markets.8 In both set
of countries, we find clear negative competition effects for domestic firms that are
direct competitors (in the same four-digit sector). These effects are driven mainly
by market share reallocation, rather than by entry and exit.
The final exercise is a back-of-the-envelope calculation, using our firm-level es-
8We find a negative knowledge spillover effect that might possibly be due to foreigner-owned
firms sourcing from foreign firms, rather than from domestic firms.
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timates to evaluate the aggregate (country-level) effect of FDI. In terms of magni-
tudes, our estimates imply that even a huge increase in FDI is not important for
country-level productivity growth. For example, a doubling of FDI from its current
levels at the country-level, implies, using our micro estimates an increase in total
factor productivity (which roughly translates into an increase in GDP) of about 0.01
percentage in developed countries and a drop of 0.01 percent in emerging countries.
These numbers incorporate both direct and spillover effects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed
description of our methodology for estimating direct and spillover effects. Section 3
details our identification strategy. Section 4 reviews the data. Section 5 shows the
results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Direct and Spillover Effects: Methodology
Foreign Ownership and Productivity of the Acquired Firms
We start the empirical analysis by exploring the relationship between foreign
ownership and firm productivity. We estimate the following equation:
log (TFPi,s,c,t) = β FOi,s,c,t + αi + µc,s,t + i,s,c,t , (1)
where TFPi,s,c,t refers to total factor productivity of firm i, in sector s, in country c,
at time t, and FOi,s,c,t is the percentage of firm i’s capital owned by foreign investors
at time t. αi represents firm-specific dummies, µc,s,t represents country-sector-year
(country×sector×year) dummies (fixed effects).
The parameter of interest is the “within” coefficient, β: a positive β implies that
changes in foreign ownership are associated with increasing productivity relative to
firms that stay domestically owned. Firms are quite heterogenous and while most
existing literature estimates equations similar to equation (1) by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), this is quite inefficient if the variance of the error terms differs
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across firms. We therefore estimate equation (1) by two-step feasible GLS.9
Productivity Spillovers to Domestic Firms
Horizontal Spillovers. Traditionally, the literature on FDI spillover has esti-
mated an equation of the following type for the sample of domestic firms:10
log (TFPi,s,t) = βSpillovers,t + αi + µt + i,s,t (2)
where TFPi,s,t refers to total factor productivity of firm i, in sector s, at time t and
Spillovers,t is a regressor, to be discussed, which captures the presence of foreign
ownership in sector s. αi represents firm-specific dummies and µt represents year
dummies. The parameter of interest is β and a positive coefficient indicates positive
productivity spillovers from foreign-owned companies to domestic firms. With firm-
fixed effects included, β captures the correlation between the changes in the Spillover
variable at the sector level and changes in firm TFP.
However, there are potential sources of endogeneity. For example, certain sec-
tors may be expected to have high productivity growth (e.g.; telecommunications
due to recent technological advances) and such sectors are likely to attract foreign
investment. We can control for such patterns by including sector-year fixed effects,
which is possible only in a multi-country data set when the spillover variable is at
the sector level. Further, we control for the possibility that certain countries, such
as the Baltics, are in a growth and investment phase by including country-year fixed
effects. We estimate the following equation by GLS for the sample of domestic firms
9The first step estimates the equation by OLS and for each firm the square root of the mean
squared residuals is calculated. In the second step, the regression is repeated, weighting each firm
by the inverse of its estimated residual standard error. GLS, although less so than OLS, can be
sensitive to the effects of outliers and therefore, we winsorize the lower tail of the weights distribution
at 5%. Graphical inspection of a partial correlation plot of the regression revealed that there are no
obvious outliers. In addition, similar results were found if weights were obtained with a parametric
model of the error variance (i.e., estimating standard errors as a function of firm characteristics).
10Domestic firms are those that were never acquired by foreign-owned investors over the sample
period.
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only as:
log (TFPi,s,c,t) = βSpillovers,c,t + αi + µc,t + φs,t + i,s,c,t (3)
where TFPi,s,c,t refers to total factor productivity of firm i, in sector s, country c, at
time t where the terms µc,t and φs,t represent country-year and sectoral-year fixed
effects, respectively.
Studies of FDI spillovers (horizontal and vertical) typically rely on a two-digit
industry classification. We argue that the two-digit classification is too aggregated
to properly identify spillovers and may mask important heterogeneity at finer sec-
tor classifications. To make this point clearly, we define, in the same fashion as
most previous work, for each country a variable intended to capture (horizontal)
spillovers in the same industry at a two-digit level as Spillovers2,t =
∑
i∈s2 FOi,t×Yi,t∑
i∈s2 Yi,t
,
where s2 refers to the two-digit sector classification and Yi,t output (operating rev-
enue) of firm i. (Country subscripts are suppressed for better exposition.) Sec-
ond, we define horizontal “Spillover Competition” at the four-digit classification
for each country as Spillover Competitions4,t =
∑
i∈s4 FOi,t×Yi,t∑
i∈s4 Yi,t
, where s4 indi-
cates a four-digit sector classification. Finally, we define “Spillover Knowledge:”
as Spillover Knowledges4,t = Spillovers2,t −
∑
i∈s4 FOi,t×Yi,t∑
i∈s2 Yi,t
, where the notation is
identical to that of the previous equations, specifically Spillovers2,t is defined before.
The knowledge spillover variable captures foreign presence in the same two-digit sec-
tor, excluding output produced by foreign-owned companies in the same four-digit
sector. For example, if a foreign-owned company is a car manufacturer (four-digit
sector classification 2910), it is possible that manufactures of electrical and electronic
equipment for motor vehicles (classification (2931)) would establish a business rela-
tionship with the company leading to knowledge transfers but not competition.
Vertical Spillovers. We round out the analysis of spillover effects by study-
ing the role of vertical spillovers. The lack of positive horizontal spillover effects in
emerging countries have lead researchers to search for spillovers along the supply
chain. Contacts with foreign-owned customers and suppliers could affect productiv-
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ity, in particular, because more advanced foreign owned firms may demand higher
quality inputs from suppliers than required by domestic firms in the same sector.
We follow Javorcik (2004) and define Spillover Backwardj,t as a measure of foreign
presence in industries that are being supplied by sector j as Spillover Backwardj,t =∑
k 6=j αjkSpilloverk2,t where αjk: proportion of sector j output supplied to sector k
where both j and k are two-digit sectors. The aim of this variable is to capture con-
tacts between domestic suppliers and foreign-owned customers. The α coefficients
are obtained from input-output matrices.
Similarly, we define Spillover Forwardj,t as a measure of foreign presence in in-
dustries supplied by sector j. The aim of this variable is to capture contacts be-
tween foreign-owned suppliers and domestic customers as Spillover Forwardj,t =∑
m 6=j σjmSpilloverm2,t, where σjm is the share of inputs purchased by industry j
from industry m in total inputs sourced by sector j.11 We obtain the input-output
coefficients from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD at http : //www.wiod.org/)
which provides standardize input-output matrices during the period 1995–2009, for
the following countries in our sample: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czec Republic,
Germany, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden. We use input-output coefficient
that vary year-by-year (most articles in the literature were limited to using input-
output coefficients from a single year).12
Business Stealing
In order to shed some light on the spillover results and further investigate the
possibility of competition effects, we explore whether foreign-owned companies tend
to increase their market shares. Increasing market shares of foreign companies do
11In calculating αjk and σjm output sold for final consumption was excluded. However, to have
the most complete information we use output sold/bought from all sectors in the economy (35
sectors) rather than just manufacturing sectors (14 sectors).
12The input-output coefficients provided by WIOD correspond to the two-digit sector classifica-
tion according to NACE Rev 1.1. We use sector correspondence tables to make the link to the
two-digit NACE Rev. 2 classification available in our dataset.
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not in themselves imply declining productivity of competitors but if competition
effects are important, market shares of foreign owned firms should increase. We
estimate the following equation:
log (MSi,s,c,t) = βFOi,s,c,t + αi + µc,s,t + i,s,t (4)
where MSi,s,c,t refers to the market share of firm i, in sector s, country c, at time t.
3 Identification
In this section, we explain the intuition behind the construction of our instruments.
A detailed discussion of their validity is relegated to the WEB-appendix. We use
instruments with the structure Zi,t = F̂Oi Ws,c,t, where F̂Oi is a non-time varying
measure of predicted foreign ownership of firm i and Ws,c,t is a measure that captures
the exogenous growth in foreign ownership that varies by country, sector, and time
but not by firm (implicit in the notation is that c and s denote the country and sector,
respectively, in which firm i operates). This instrument needs to be correlated with
FOi,t in equation (TFP) (“relevance”) and it needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction
that it is uncorrelated with the structural innovation term ui,t (see Appendix).
The relevance condition is intuitive: firms with more predicted foreign ownership
increase foreign ownership faster. If this condition is not satisfied it will be revealed
by insignificant empirical results—the relevance assumption will not lead to bias.
To construct our instrument, first, we choose F̂Oi to be the initial level of foreign
ownership FOi0.
13 For this to be valid, it is essential that firm fixed effects are
included in the regression.
Second, for a time-varying measure of growth in foreign ownership, Ws,c,t, (now
13We obtain very similar results by estimating a probit model, where the probability of having
foreign owners is a function of β0FOi,t−1+β1 log (K/L)i,t−1+β2 log (VA/L)i,t−1+β3 log (ASSETS)i,t−1+
β4 log (ASSETS)
2
i,t−1 + β5AGEi,t + β6AGE
2
i,t + µct + φst + i,t , and use the predicted probability of
foreign ownership, using for the first year values for variables involved for firm i.
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making the country dependence explicit again), we construct
IIs,c,t =
∑
i∈c,s FO
I
i,tYi,0∑
i∈c,s Yi,0
; (5)
where FOIi,t is industrial ownership by foreign companies. I.e., I
I
s,c,t is sector-level
foreign industrial ownership in country c at time t. We further construct
IFs,c,t =
∑
i∈c,s FO
F
i,tYi,0∑
i∈c,s Yi,0
; (6)
where FOFi,t is ownership by foreign financial companies. I.e., I
F
s,c,t is sector-level
foreign financial ownership in country c at time t.
We assume that country-sector level financial ownership is a function of future
profit opportunities in the relevant sector-country cell as they accrue to a passive
financial investor. We further assume that industrial foreign ownership is determined
by the same factors as financial foreign ownership plus a factor
IIs,c,t = b I
F
s,c,t + δWs,c,t + es,c,t , (7)
where Ws,c,t is the investment driven by extra future income that industrial owners
can obtain from active management (or from market power, in case of mergers—
whatever is specific to industrial ownership). If we know b, we can use IIs,c,t−b IFs,c,t =
δWs,c,t + es,c,t as an exogenous instrument because the component of country-sector
foreign ownership which is due to predicted future profits from passive investment,
and which is the source of potential reverse causality, has been subtracted.
We obtain an estimate of b by regressing II on IF and take residuals, Ws,c,t,
which is part of our instrument; i.e.,
Ws,c,t = I
I
s,c,t − bˆ IFs,c,t (8)
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Because firm fixed effects are included, we refer to this variable as sector-level
growth in foreign ownership. We further hedge against endogeneity by including
country-sector-year dummies in our regressions.
4 Data
We focus on a European subset of ORBIS where coverage is better because company
reporting is regulatory. We start from 40 European countries and 1.42 million unique
firms, for which detailed information is available, 1996–2008. After implementing
some preliminary cleaning to eliminate outliers and data mistakes we are down to
around 800 thousand firms in these countries (4.3 million firm-year observations).14
After detailed data cleaning explained in Appendix: Data, we retain a subset of firms
to have more than 15 employees (350 thousand firms) and data for TFP calculation
(210 thousand firms). Focusing only on the manufacturing sector, we have 134
thousand firms from 12 developed and 13 emerging countries, 1999–2008.15
Variables and descriptive statistics
The main financial variables used are total assets, operating revenue, tangible
fixed assets, and expenditure on materials. We convert financial variables to “PPP
US dollars with 2005 base,” using country GDP deflators (2005 base) and convert-
ing to dollars using the end-of-year 2005 exchange rate. The distribution of these
(logged) variables does not change much over time and is very close to normal. Em-
ployment is in persons, and the distribution of employment is skewed with many
firms having 15 employees (our chosen minimum).
Firm productivity. We construct TFP as the residual from a Cobb-Douglas produc-
14Appendix Table A-6 shows regressions using this largest sample.
15Panel A in Appendix Table A-2 shows the number of observations and firms after most of the
cleaning. Panel B shows the lower number of observations with data available for calculating TFP
numbers. Appendix Figure A-1 shows the average percentage of observations by sectoral categories
in the samples of panel B of Table A-2. We focus on manufacturing, which contains roughly 40
percent of the observations, to be consistent with the literature. See Appendix Table A-3 for
detailed sector classification.
13
tion function with capital and labor: log (TFPi,t) = log (Yi,t − Mi,t) − α1 log (Li,t) −
α2 log (Ki,t), where the coefficients are estimated by the method of Wooldridge,
Levinsohn and Petrin (WLP), as explained in Appendix: Data.16
Explanatory variables. The ownership section of ORBIS contains detailed informa-
tion on owners of both listed and private firms, including name, country of residence,
and type (e.g., bank, industrial company, private equity, individual, and so on). The
database refers to each record of ownership as an “ownership link.” An ownership
link indicating that an entity A owns a certain percentage of firm B is referred as
a “direct” ownership link. BvD traces a direct link between two entities even when
the ownership percentage is very small (sometimes less than 1 percent). For listed
companies, very small stock holders are typically unknown.17 In addition, ORBIS
contains information on-so called “ultimate” owners (UO) of the company by trac-
ing the ownership pyramid beyond the direct owners. To find UOs of a company,
BvD focuses on identifying the owners, if any, who exercise the greater degree of
control over the company. We prefer direct ownership to ultimate ownership because
the former allows to reliably measure a continuous ownership variable over time as
reported by the original sources (see Appendix: Data for comparison of the two
measures). We compute the Foreign Ownership (FO) as the sum of all percentages
of direct ownership by foreigners. Owners of unknown origin (typically small) are
assigned to the home country. We define a firm to be “domestic” only if it never had
16We estimate TFP by country and sector and winsorize the resulting distribution at the 1 and
99 percentiles by country. However, similar results are obtained if TFP is estimated by country, or
by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and regardless of the level of winsorizing chosen (we also tried
winsorizing the total sample at the 1 and 99 percentiles, winsorizing by country at the 5 and 95
percentiles, and by sector at the 1 and 99, and 5 and 95, percentiles). See Appendix: Data for more
details.
17Countries have different rules for when the identity of a minority owner needs to be disclosed;
for example, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden demand that listed firms disclose
all owners with more than a five percent stake, while disclosure is required at three percent in
the UK, and at two percent in Italy. Information regarding US companies taken from the SEC
Edgar Filings and the NASDAQ, however, stops at one percent. BvD collects its ownership data
from the official registers (including SEC filings and stock exchanges), annual reports, private
correspondence, telephone research, company websites, and news wires.
14
any type of foreign owner, including these other types, during the sample period.18
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 displays the fractions of firms with foreign ownership.
From Panel A, FO is relatively high in the manufacturing and retail sectors and the
share of output of firms with foreign financial owners is considerably smaller than
that of firms with foreign industrial owners. Overall, foreign-owned firms contribute
about 7 percent of output of all firms. Panel B in Table 1 explores the relative
importance of foreign-owned companies across developed and emerging countries
overall and by owner type. There is slightly more foreign-owned firms in emerging
markets but the difference is small. Focusing on firms with positive industrial or
financial FO in at least one year in the remainder of Panel B, we observe that
industrial FO clearly dominates financial FO in both groups of countries but financial
foreign owners “prefer” firms in developed countries slightly more.
The distribution of controlling ownership shares (i.e., more than 50 percent of
company equity) follows the total ownership ranking for country groups and FO type,
but the differences in industrial FO between country groups are more pronounced.
71 percent of emerging-country firms with foreign ownership have controlling indus-
trial FO, while this share in developed countries is 60 percent. The distributions of
FO in Panel C are drawn from the regression samples of firms in the manufacturing
sector. The ownership patterns in this smaller sample closely follow the patterns
observed in the “All Industries” sample of Panel B, which makes us confident in
the representativeness of our regression sample (also apparent from Appendix Fig-
ures A-2 and A-3 showing the distribution of foreign ownership). In developed
countries, the distributions of FO and Industrial FO is bi-modal whereas they are
skewed towards full ownership in emerging markets. More than two thirds of the
firms with non-negative FO, have foreign stakes of less than a 20 percent, in both
18For example, if a company has three foreign owners with stakes of 10, 15, and 35 percent, FO
for this company is 60 percent. A financial owner is a bank, financial company, insurance company,
mutual or pension fund, other financial institution, or private equity firm. FOIi,s,c,t (Industrial FO)
FO
F
i,s,c,t ( Financial FO) are the shares owned by foreign industria and financial investors, respec-
tively.
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groups of countries. There is a spike in the number of firms with an ownership share
around 50 percent, likely reflecting a desire to control the firm.
Figure 1 plots non-parametric probability density estimates of the logarithm
of firm-level WLP’s TFP. The firm sample includes firms which never had foreign
owners (domestic firms, black solid lines) and firms with positive foreign ownership
(foreign-owned firms, red dashed line). In both samples, firms with some or control-
ling foreign ownership are more productive, and these differences are statistically
significant.19
Appendix Table A-4 reports descriptive statistics and Appendix Table A-5 shows
counts of observations and firms and average values of log TFP and FO (in percent)
by year. There is considerable time variation in ownership shares and productivity
in both subsamples. FO exhibits a clear upward trend as the world economy becomes
more globalized by late 2000s.
Appendix Table A-6 shows correlations between labor productivity and foreign
activity for firms in all industries or in manufacturing using a raw uncleaned sample.
There is a clear positive correlation between foreign ownership and labor produc-
tivity, if firm fixed effects are not accounted for, a pattern that has inspired many
recent trade and FDI models.20 However, after the inclusion of firm fixed effects, the
positive coefficient halves or completely disappears, depending on the productivity
measure.21 This highlights the importance of firm-level selection. When firm-fixed
effects are included, correlations are calculated from within-firm changes over time,
suggesting that foreign ownership does not lead to an increase in the productivity of
acquired firms. While other factors could influence the simple correlations displayed,
this prima facie evidence points to multinationals investing in a priori productive
19Results of the difference of means and medians tests are available upon request.
20See Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) for similar results on labor productivity using data on
US multinationals.
21This sample has 4 million observations overall and over 1 million observations in manufacturing.
Our regression samples are much smaller because we need data on, e.g., materials. We use the full
sample in Appendix Table A-6 in order to document that this pattern is not an artifact of data
cleaning.
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firms. Keeping in mind these issues, we turn to a comprehensive regression analysis.
5 Results
5.1 Are Foreign Firms More Productive?
Table 2 shows the relationship between foreign ownership and firm total factor pro-
ductivity in the manufacturing sector. We present results for developed and emerg-
ing countries separately because of conflicting results for these groups of countries
found in the literature.22 The model described in equation (1) is estimated by Gen-
eralized Least Squares (GLS) which is more efficient than OLS due to the great
heterogeneity in the sample.
As we have been emphasizing, accounting for firm selection is crucial and all
specifications in Table 2 include firm fixed effects. An additional factor that we
have stressed is the role of country and sector selection. Foreigners may invest in
growing countries, sectors, or country-sectors resulting in reverse causality; conse-
quently, all columns account for country-sector-year fixed effects. Columns (1) and
(4) of Table 2 show that even after controlling for country-sector-year effects there
is a positive and statistically significant relationship between foreign ownership and
firm productivity. However, this effect is not of much economic importance in de-
veloped countries: a ten percent increase in foreign ownership will be associated
with a 0.07 percent increase in firm productivity (see column (1)). The relatively
small productivity gap between foreign-owned and domestic companies shown in
column (1) is not particular to the sample of developed countries where the tech-
nology gap between foreign-owned companies and domestic companies is smaller
(Girma (2005)). Column (4), for emerging countries, shows a 0.5 percent increase
in productivity associated with a ten percent increase in foreign ownership. Only
considerable increases in firm ownership (of the order of 100 percent change) would
22See, among others, Aitken and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004), Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter
(2007) and Keller and Yeaple (2009).
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lead to a substantial increase in firms’ productivity.
The results of Table 2 are obtained in regressions that include firm-fixed effects.
Early studies (see Aitken and Harrison (1999) or Javorcik (2004)) find a positive and
significant correlation between foreign ownership and firm productivity which turns
insignificant once firm fixed effects are included. Therefore, these early studies
find a positive correlation between foreign ownership and productivity levels but
not between foreign ownership growth and productivity growth. Our set of control
dummy variables guarantees that the results in Table 2 are not driven by foreign
investors targeting growing countries, growing sectors, or firms with constant higher
productivity. However, it is probable that firm productivity changes over time and,
therefore, we still need to correct for foreign investors targeting firms with increasing
productivity. We analyze this possibility in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2 following
the instrumental variable methodology outlined in Section 3.
Panel A in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2 shows the second stage results while
Panel B shows the first stage results. It is clear from Panel B that the instrument
and the endogenous variable (i.e., foreign ownership) are highly correlated. In both
sets of countries, the instrumented coefficients are larger than the GLS-coefficients,
suggesting significant heterogeneity across firms. Our interpretation of this dif-
ference is, therefore, that we are estimating a Local Average Treatment Effect.23
Investors know the growth prospects of firms and our identifying assumption is that
the amount of investment of industrial owners which is orthogonal to that of finan-
cial owners is exogenous to firms’ future growth prospect in the absence of foreign
investment.24
23Some downward bias in GLS could be due to measurement error, but for this to change the
coefficient as much as we observe the variance of the measurement error would have to dominate
the variance of foreign ownership. We firmly believe that this is not the case after cleaning and
winsorizing our data.
24The survey article by Card (2001) shows that IV estimates being larger than non-instrumented
estimates is the typical finding in the context of the returns-to-schooling literature where the returns
are highly likely to be heterogenous across agents. The theoretical explanation, given by Imbens
and Angrist (1994), is that the IV-estimates measure local average treatment effects (LATE), where
the treatment (schooling laws) affects some individuals more than others.
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We outline our interpretation by considering the simplest possible case. Assume
there are two, equally large, groups of firms which are differently impacted by for-
eign investment. For firms belonging to group j (j = 1, 2), foreign investment is
∆FOjit = dj∆Z
j
it + v
j
it. Firms in group 1, where d1 is large, are firms which are more
likely targets of industrial than of financial investors. Under regularity conditions
in large samples, the first-stage WLS estimate from a regression using the combined
sample is ∆FO = d1+d22 ∆Z. Consider also the case where the impact of foreign in-
vestment differs between groups: ∆TFPit = βj∆FO
j
it+eit. An IV regression of ∆TFP
on ∆FO , using our instrument Z, gives, in large samples, the coefficient E{∆TFP Z}E{∆FO Z} ,
which equals d1β1+d2β2d1+d2 , that is, a weighted average of β1 and β2. Relatively larger co-
efficients d1 and β1 imply that the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate which
gives equal weight to β1 and β2. If, as we will find, the IV-coefficient is significantly
larger than the OLS estimate, we interpret this as reflecting heterogeneity where
the group of firms for which foreign ownership growth correlates more with indus-
trial ownership growth orthogonal to financial ownership growth (here labeled with
subscript 1) displays larger productivity changes when foreign ownership changes.
We find it intuitive that firms that are targeted by industrial owners are those for
which foreign investment is associated with active management which brings about
relatively large effects on productivity.
The estimated effect in column (2) of Table 2 is larger than the OLS estimate, but
it is still very small. The effect is likely small because the high economic integration
among developed countries results in very small gaps in “hard technology” between
developed countries. While we do not did deeper on this issue in the present article,
we interpret the difference in productivity shown in column (2) as more likely to
correspond to “soft technology” transfers based on the results of Bloom, Sadun,
and Van Reenen (2012).25 In the case of emerging countries, there is little evidence
25Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012) show that establishments taken over by US multina-
tionals (but not by non-US multinationals) increased the productivity of their IT. They find that
the US IT-related productivity advantage is primarily due to better people management practices.
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of a causal impact of foreign ownership on firm productivity as the second stage
coefficient in column (5) is not significant.26
For comparison to the literature, we also estimate equation (1) in two-year dif-
ferences. We experimented with one-year differences but (unreported) results were
not robust. The two-year differences captures impacts on total factor productiv-
ity which only materialize with some lag and the second-year differences also give
lower weight to outliers. Columns (3) and (6) in Table 2 corroborate the small
or non-existent average results reported in columns (2) and (5). In the case of
emerging countries, the standard deviations are fairly large, reflecting the smaller
sample.27 In unreported results, the estimates are sensitive to the exact choice of
instruments (with the coefficient (standard error) ranging from a low 0.096 (0.082)
to a significant 0.259 (0.106)). We chose to report the coefficient obtained using
both the lagged level and differences of the instrument because it appears to deliver
the most robust point estimate, being similar to the coefficient in column (5), but
clearly our results for developing countries have large confidence bands.28 There
are mixed results in the literature regarding the causal effect of foreign ownership
on firm productivity (see Arnold and Javorcik (2009)). Overall, the results suggest
that the motives behind foreign investment might not necessarily involve technology
transfer: foreign-owned firms could target domestic firms in order to diversify and
such investments do not involve transfer of technology and/or foreign-owned firms
might seek to expand into foreign markets through acquisition of domestic firms
resulting in higher market shares for the target, issue to which we will return later.
26The point estimate is larger, but the IV estimate is quite imprecise in the smaller emerging
market sample, so we cannot rule out either that some firms in emerging countries experience a
jump in productivity with foreign investment.
27Only firms with a change in foreign ownership provides identification and a very large number
of degrees of freedom are used on fixed effects and dummies, which is why 30,000+ observations
does not constitute a large sample. 4,840 firms (13,840 observations) in developed countries and
1,066 firms (2,606 observations) in emerging countries changed foreign ownership.
28The significant 0.259 coefficient in the two-year specification implies that in emerging countries
a 50 percent increase in foreign ownership leads to a 12.5 percent increase in productivity over two
years which is similar in magnitude to previous findings in the literature.
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The aim of the paper is to provide an estimate of aggregate productivity gains
caused by foreign investment at the country level. This total effect is decomposed
into direct effects (i.e., productivity changes in domestic targets after acquisition)
and indirect effects (i.e., spillover effects or productivity changes in fully domes-
tic firms operating in sectors with growing foreign activity). After having shown
evidence of limited direct effects, we turn to the study of potential spillover effects.
5.2 What are the Spillovers from FDI?
Traditionally, the empirical literature has found positive horizontal productivity
spillovers in developed countries and negative productivity spillovers in developing
countries. We explore this issue in Table 3 with a sample of domestic companies.
Columns (1) to (4) refer to developed countries while columns (5) to (8) refer to
emerging countries. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) define spillovers using two-digit
sector classifications as it is common in the literature. Column (1) shows that
foreign-owned companies have a significant positive impact on the productivity of
the typical domestic firm in the same two-digit sector. Researchers who are skeptical
about the role of foreign investment in transferring knowledge and technology argue
that results, such as those of column (1), likely are the result of foreign-owned com-
panies targeting more productive sectors. The previous empirical literature, focusing
on the experience of individual countries, as well as lacking suitable instruments,
was not able to properly address this issue.29
Column (2) includes sector-year fixed effects which control for effects that are
common to firms in the same sector across countries, in particular technological
innovations that all firms in a sector can benefit from. Compared to column (1),
there is a considerable reduction in the size of the spillover coefficient and it is
no longer statistically significant. This decrease in the coefficient can mean that
foreigners target more productive sectors or that, if spillovers are present, they are
29One exception is Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007), who use an instrumental variable
approach to tackle this concern in a sample of UK manufacturing firms.
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partly (or mainly) global for typical firms operating in the same sector. While we
cannot literally rule this out, spillovers are more likely to be local (and much of the
policy relevance of this issue revolves around the issue of local spillovers). Contrary
to our findings for developed countries, column (5) in Table 3 reveals a negative
and significant effect of foreign-owned companies in the same two-digit sector—a
finding in line with previous results of Aitken and Harrison (1999), who use firm-
level panel data for Venezuela. They argue that positive knowledge spillovers may
be counteracted by negative competition effects. Column (6) of Table 3 shows that
the negative spillover effect prevails in emerging countries even after controlling for
sector-year fixed effects. The negative effect, as expected from a direct competition
explanation, is, therefore, predominantly local.
We expect competition effects to be dominant within the same four-digit sec-
tor classification, while potential technology and knowledge transfers might come
from foreign presence in the same two-digit sector. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3
present the main results for developed countries. Once we focus on effects within
the thinner 4-digit sector classification, we find negative competition effects in de-
veloped countries and positive and significant knowledge spillovers. The positive
knowledge spillovers are similar in magnitude to the negative competition spillovers
when sector-year trends are included which explains the insignificant spillover re-
sults found in column (2) of Table 3. Including four-digit sector-year fixed effects
addresses the possibility that foreign-owned companies target more productive sec-
tors and has a direct economic interpretation. Competition is local, so we do not
observe significant changes in the size of the spillover competition coefficient after
including sector-year fixed effects, consistent with our interpretation of our results
actually capturing competition; on the other hand, knowledge transfers are partly
global and are universally available within the same sector.30 Strictly speaking,
30If four-digit sector-year fixed effects are not included in developed countries, the coefficient
(standard error) on Spillover Competition is -0.021 (0.004) and on Spillover Knowledge 0.037
(0.007).
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“global” refers to other developed countries where it is reasonable that, say, all car
manufactures benefit from large global investments in, say, fuel systems—we do not
examine global spillovers from developed to emerging countries. For the difference
specification in column (4), the knowledge spillover coefficient is twice as large as
for the level specification while the competition effects are halved. The level regres-
sion is likely capturing more permanent effects so the interpretation would be that
competition effects are more permanent while knowledge effects dilute over time.
We think longer time-series are necessary to sort this out and prefer to take away
that the qualitative results are robust to the exact specification.
The positive knowledge spillovers is a new result which previous research has
overlooked due to a higher sectoral aggregation. In line with vertical linkages the-
ories, we find that there is scope for positive productivity spillovers from foreign-
owned companies to domestic companies that are not direct competitors.
Columns (7) and (8) in Table 3 repeat the analysis for the sample of emerging
countries. Column (7) shows that there are negative productivity spillovers from
foreign-owned companies operating in the same four-digit sector. Unexpectedly, we
also find negative knowledge spillovers in emerging markets. We believe competition
for resources may be the root of the negative “knowledge spillovers.” If emerging
markets have a limited pool of workers with appropriate training for modern firms,
domestic firms will be hurt if those workers are hired away to firms with foreign
ownership. The negative competition effect is also found in the difference specifi-
cation of column (8). For emerging countries, the magnitudes of the estimates are
very robust to the choice of specification.
Finally, Table A-7 in the Appendix considers a balanced (or “permanent”) panel
of firms—firms observed over the full 2000-2007 period. By focusing on a permanent
sample of firms, we examine if the results are reflecting new highly productive firms
entering the sample reflecting Schumpeterian creative-destruction. However, the
results in columns (1) and (3) of Table A-7 show that the effects found in Table 3
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are not solely, nor mainly, reflecting entry and exit.
5.3 Business Stealing Effects
In Table 4, we explore if foreign investment is indeed associated with increasing
market shares of recipients of foreign investment. If our negative four-digit com-
petition results are truly competition effects, we should observe that foreign-owned
companies increase their market shares. We, therefore, examine if output market
shares, defined as the share of firm i’s output in total sectoral output at the four-
digit sector classification, are explained by foreign ownership. Columns (1) and (2)
consider developed countries while columns (3) and (4) consider emerging countries.
According to columns (1) and (3), companies that receive investments from foreign
investors experience an increase in market shares which indicate that foreign owned
firms grow faster at the expense of other firms in the same narrow sector. However,
similar to the argument made for productivity in the previous section, it could be
that foreign investors target domestic firms which are already growing dispropor-
tionately fast. Columns (2) and (4) address this concern by reporting instrumental
variable results. In both developed and emerging markets, the instrumented coeffi-
cient is higher and statistically significant. In terms of economic magnitudes, there
is a significant difference between the effect in developed and in emerging markets.
A 10 percent increase in foreign ownership in developed countries translates into a
0.4 percent increase in market shares while a similar increase in emerging countries
results in a 2 percent increase in market share. These results, with stronger effect
in emerging countries, lends strong credence to our interpretation that the negative
spillovers uncovered indeed are due to competition effects.
5.4 Vertical Spillovers
Table 5 considers backward and forward spillovers to suppliers or customers, respec-
tively, of foreign owned firms. For comparison with the literature, we control for
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2-digit horizontal spillovers. In the first row, we see a positive and significant co-
efficient on the Backward variable in both developed and emerging countries. This
indicates positive productivity spillovers between domestic firms and their foreign-
owned customers in downstream sectors. While backward spillovers of similar mag-
nitudes have been previously found in the literature (see for example Javorcik (2004),
Liu (2008) and the references therein), findings of backward spillovers in developed
countries are more scant. Barrios, Go¨rg, and Strobl (2011) using firm-level data
from Ireland find little support for backward spillovers when standard measures are
employed. However, they find robust evidence for positive backward spillovers when
constructing measures that consider the percentage of domestically produced inputs
versus imported inputs.
There is no indication of vertical linkages through contacts with foreign-owned
suppliers, as the forward variable is insignificant in developed countries and even
negative in emerging markets.31 The backward spillovers appear quite orthogonal
to horizon spillovers within the two-digit sector as the coefficient to the horizontal
spillover variable is of a similar magnitude to that estimated in Table 3. Overall, our
results confirm those found in the literature. Even the magnitude of our estimated
backward spillover coefficients are similar to the results of Javorcik (2004), so we do
not further pursue this issue.32
5.5 The Role of Firm Heterogeneity
One of the main insights from the first wave of firm-level micro studies is that firms
are heterogeneous, which has inspired the development of new theories emphasiz-
ing this fact (see Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and
31Javorcik (2004) also finds a negative coefficient on the forward spillover variable in the case of
Lithuania.
32Javorcik (2004) uses a panel of Lithuanian firms from 1996-2000 and estimates regressions
in first differences, including sector dummies which is equivalent to sector specific trends in levels.
Given the short time dimension of her sample that approach is not very different from our approach
of including sector-year fixed effects.
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Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) among others). According to the early research,
only a small fraction of firms engage in export activities and an even smaller fraction
of firms become multinational. The theoretical models developed to accommodate
these empirical findings have implications for within and between sectoral alloca-
tion of resources: within-industry reallocation effects contribute to higher sectoral
productivity as greater competition from exporting firms drive less productive firms
out of the market. An implication is that not all domestic firms will be equally
affected by the presence of foreign-owned firms in their same sector of activity or
related sectors. A less explored aspect of firm heterogeneity is differences in firm
productivity arising from varying degrees of foreign ownership.
We consider two dimensions of heterogeneity: the differences in the percentage of
firm capital owned by foreign investors and differences in the initial productivity of
domestic firms. First, Table 6 studies whether competition and knowledge spillovers
varies across domestic firms. We consider firms’ total factor productivity in the first
year of the sample (our measure of ex-ante productivity) and we split the sample
according to whether firms are in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of the
total factor productivity distribution in each country-sector cell. Once firms are
categorized according to their ex-ante productivity, we replicate the results of Table 3
for different quantiles. The dependent variable is firm total factor productivity and
we focus again on the sample of domestic firms.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows results for developed countries while column (2)
shows results for emerging countries. In developed countries, the negative competi-
tion effect is present for all firms, although the effect is somewhat larger for firms
in the lowest and highest quantiles. Positive knowledge spillovers are concentrated
among firms with total factor productivity in the top quartile. This is consistent
with the idea that only the better firms have enough absorptive capacities to benefit
from the presence of foreign-owned firms. In emerging countries, the competition
effects are similar, albeit larger, than found in developed countries. Knowledge
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spillover effects are negative for all quantiles in emerging countries, although the
effect is not significant for the lowest and the highest categories.
Second, regarding foreign ownership heterogeneity, Figure 1 shows the the the
TFP distribution of foreign-owned companies is to the right of that of domestic
companies, whether we define foreign ownership in terms of majority control or
not. Do spillovers vary depending on majority/minority ownership in the sector?
Table 7 shows that the negative competition effect derived from foreign presence
in the same four-digit sector is not specific to majority owners. Domestic firms
in developed and emerging countries are hurt by increasing investment of foreign
investors in the same four-digit sector regardless of the extent of foreign control in
companies. More interestingly, for developed countries, positive knowledge spillovers
are driven by foreign majority owned companies, see column (1) of Table 7. This
supports the notion suggesting that foreign minority ownership typically does not
imply technology transfer but rather is undertaken for diversification of income.
Majority control involves decision making of the foreign parent, as well as lower risk
of information leakage, both aspects encouraging technology transfer to the target
company and therefore, a higher potential for spillovers for non-direct competitors.33
5.6 Aggregate Effects
We evaluate the effect of a doubling of foreign ownership in percent of aggregate as-
sets using our point estimates. A doubling of foreign ownership leads to a doubling
of FO, which implies that we change the right hand side by the means giving in Ta-
ble A-4, which for developed countries are FO = 0.05, Spillover Competition = 0.10,
Spillover Knowledge = 0.10, Spillover Forward = 0.09, and Spillover Backward =
0.13. Using the estimated coefficients34 of 0.031, –0.028, 0.020, 0.063, and 0.027;
respectively, we find a total effect of 0.011 percent (0.009 percent if the insignificant
33Similar results, although somewhat weaker due to the smaller sample, are found when a perma-
nent sample of firms (continually observed 2000-2007) is considered (see Table A-7 in the appendix).
34From Table 2 column 2, Table 3 column 3, Table 3 column 3, and Table 5 column 1.
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coefficient to Spillover Forward is set to 0).35
The corresponding statistics for emerging countries are FO = 0.07, Spillover Competition =
0.11, Spillover Knowledge = 0.09, Spillover Forward = 0.09, and Spillover Backward =
0.15 and using the estimated coefficients36 of 0.125,−0.080,−0.078, 0.076, and−0.089;
respectively, we find a total effect of –0.004 (–0.012 percent if the insignificant coef-
ficient to FO is set to 0).
Clearly, the impact of FDI on productivity is not of first-order importance for
economic growth. Our paper stops short of evaluating other possible effects of FDI,
for example, direct ownership may bring in capital to firms which are unable to
obtain bank-financing due to borrowing constraints. FDI may also increase risk
sharing between countries. We do not attempt to quantify any of such effects in the
present paper, but all are important questions for further research.
6 Conclusion
The last two decades have witnessed an extensive policy push for more FDI from
governments and international organizations. Structural policies have been designed
to attract FDI, ranging from sectoral subsidies to lower taxes for multinationals—all
under the assumption that more FDI will bring more growth. We show in this paper
that there is no systematic evidence that supports the notion of substantial growth
effects from FDI.
Using a multi-country firm level data set, we find that foreign-owned firms are
hardly more productive than other firms and the positive correlation between for-
eign ownership and productivity mainly is driven by positive selection. There are
positive knowledge spillovers from FDI to domestic firms in developed countries but
35The effects are additive, so the calculation is simply 0.05 ∗ 0.031 + .10 ∗ (−0.028) + .10 ∗ 0.020 +
0.13 ∗ 0.063 + 0.09 ∗ 0.027 = 0.011. The calculation, for simplicity, assigns spillovers to all firms,
whether of not they have foreign owners—assigning spillovers to domestic firms only would not
change the magnitudes noticeably.
36From Table 2 column 5, Table 3 column 7, Table 3 column 7, and Table 5 column 2.
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these are almost one-to-one offset by negative competition spillovers. In emerging
countries, both competition and knowledge spillovers are negative (which, of course,
calls into question the label “knowledge spillovers”). We find positive effects of FDI
on suppliers of foreign owned firms, but these are minor. Together, the various
effects imply that even a doubling of FDI leads to about a one percentage point
increase of output in developed countries and a one percentage point decrease of
output in emerging countries.
Although, as we show, there are no total productivity effects from FDI, we do
not rule out that FDI may generate employment, provide capital, and improve risk
sharing and consumption smoothing. FDI may also generate healthy competition
in the labor markets offering higher wages. FDI might even have growth-enhancing
indirect benefits though its effect on structural policies. As shown by Rodrik (2013),
manufacturing labor productivity has converged across the world; however, this
type of convergence has not led to aggregate growth convergence because many
governments obstruct structural transformation. FDI can help to speed up this
process indirectly, even though it does not provide direct productivity benefits for
the country.
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Tables
Table 1: Relative Importance of Foreign Ownership across Sectors and Samples
Panel A: Percentage of Observations by Ownership Category and Industry, Firms in All Industries
Sample Developed Emerging
FO Measure FO Industrial Financial FO Industrial Financial
FO FO FO FO
Industry
Agric. and Mining 4.4 4.3 0.3 2.3 2.3 0.1
Construction 1.4 1.4 0.1 2.0 1.9 0.2
Manufacturing 8.4 8.1 0.5 9.7 9.5 0.5
Retail 9.0 8.8 0.4 7.5 7.4 0.3
Services 5.1 4.8 0.5 6.1 5.8 0.4
Total 6.9 6.6 0.4 7.1 6.9 0.4
Panel B: Percentage of Observations by Ownership Category, Firms in All Industries
Sample All Firms Foreign-owned Firms
FO Industrial Financial Industrial Financial FO> 50% Industrial Financial
FO FO FO FO FO > 50% FO > 50%
Emerging 7.1 6.9 0.4 97.2 5.2 72.5 71.1 1.2
Developed 6.8 6.6 0.4 96.2 6.0 62.9 61.5 1.4
Total 6.9 6.6 0.4 96.4 5.8 64.9 63.4 1.3
Panel C: Percentage of Observations by Ownership Category, Firms in Manufacturing
Sample All Firms Foreign-owned Firms
FO Industrial Financial Industrial Financial FO> 50% Industrial Financial
FO FO FO FO FO> 50% FO> 50%
Emerging 9.4 9.3 0.4 98.5 3.8 71.1 70.1 0.8
Developed 8.1 7.8 0.5 96.5 5.7 61.1 59.6 1.4
Total 8.3 8.0 0.5 96.9 5.4 62.9 61.5 1.3
Notes: The distributions in Panels A and B are drawn from the sample with available data for
TFP construction (Panel B of Table A-2), while the distributions in Panel C are drawn from the
regression samples of firms in the manufacturing sector with available data for the main regressions
(see Data Appendix). Panel A reports the percentage of all firms in all available years (observations)
in a given industry. Agric. and Mining refers to Agriculture and Mining and corresponds to NACE
2-digit sector classification: 01, 02, 03, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09. Manufacturing: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. Construction: 41, 42, 43. Services:
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85,
86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96. Retail: 45, 46, 47. See Table A-3 for the industry classification.
The “total” sample shows the distribution for the entire sample of firms with available data for
TFP construction. FO refers to industrial plus financial FO (marked FO), or either of these two types
(marked Industrial FO and Financial FO; resp.). FO is the percentage share of firm’s voting equity owned
by foreign owners. Panels B and C report the percentage of observations by ownership category.
“All firms” report on firms with available data for TFP construction (Panel B) or the regression
samples of firms in the manufacturing sector (Panel C). The “foreign-owned” sample includes a
subset of firms with industrial FO, or financial FO, or industrial plus financial FO positive in at least
one year. “FO> 50%” refers to firms with controlling foreign ownership (FO higher than 50% of
voting shares).
33
Table 2: Total Factor Productivity and Foreign Ownership: Are Foreign Firms more
Productive?
Dependent Variable: Firm Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: GLS and Second Stage Results
Developed Emerging
ESTIMATION METHOD gls gls&iv gls&iv gls gls&iv gls&iv
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log TFP log TFP ∆2 log TFP log TFP log TFP ∆2 log TFP
log FO 0.007** 0.031** 0.048*** 0.125
(0.003) (0.014) (0.010) (0.108)
∆2 log FO 0.023 0.116
(0.017) (0.082)
Observations 402,137 402,137 235,529 72,349 72,349 36,479
Firms 59,306 59,306 46,313 12,758 12,758 9,450
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes no yes yes no
Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Country-Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Cluster firm . . firm . .
Panel B: First Stage Results
log FO ∆2 log FO log FO ∆2 log FO
log(F̂O0 ×Growth FOs,c,t) 66.5*** 24.91***
(2.34) (3.78)
log(F̂O0 ×Growth FOs,c,t−2) -13.846*** -23.144***
(1.98) (2.68)
∆2 log(F̂O0 ×Growth FOs,c,t) 56.62*** 25.75***
(3.48) (6.24)
Observations 402,137 235,529 72,349 36,479
Firms 59,306 46,313 12,758 9,450
F-Test 770.24 237.23 43.37 53.65
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity, computed using the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology
(WLP). log FOi,t is the log of one plus the percent share of foreign ownership in firm i capital structure; the instrument log(F̂O0 ×
Growth FOs,c,t) enters the first-stage regression in the same transformation. F̂O0 is a non-time varying measure of predicted foreign
ownership of firm i, equal to the initial level of foreign ownership of firm i. Growth FOs,c,t represents a measure correlated with growth
in foreign ownership that varies by sector s, country c and year t where firm i operates, but not by firm. We obtain an estimate of
Growth FOs,c,t as the residuals from the regression of sector-level foreign industrial ownership in country c at time t, I
I
s,c,t, on sector-level
foreign financial ownership in country c at time t, IFs,c,t, (i.e., Growth FOs,c,t = I
I
s,c,t − bˆIFs,c,t). The GLS estimation use as weights re the
square root of firm mean squared predicted residuals. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) the dependent variable and the regressands are
measured at time t. Columns (3) and (6) are specifications in differences; ∆2 indicates the difference between t and t − 2. Columns (1)
to (3) focus on the sample of developed countries while columns (4) to (6) repeat the analysis for the sample of Emerging countries.
Standard errors clustered at the corresponding level specified in the table are reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, denote significance at
1%, 5%, 10% levels. See Sections 2 and 4 for details on variable construction.
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Table 3: Are There Positive Spillover Effects from Foreign Ownership?
Dependent Variable: Firm Productivity
Sample: Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Developed Emerging
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log TFP log TFP log TFP ∆2 log TFP log TFP log TFP log TFP ∆2 log TFP
Spillovers2 0.026** 0.008 -0.061*** -0.090***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Spillover Competitions4 -0.028*** -0.080***
(0.004) (0.011)
Spillover Knowledges4 0.020** -0.078***
(0.008) (0.018)
∆2Spillover Competitions4 -0.015** -0.087***
(0.005) (0.015)
∆2Spillover Knowledges4 0.046*** -0.092***
(0.010) (0.024)
Observations 350,344 350,344 350,344 204,224 58,573 58,573 58,573 28,981
Firms 52,153 52,153 52,153 10,554 10,554 10,554
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes no yes yes yes no
Country-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector2dig-Year Fixed Effects no yes N/A N/A no yes N/A N/A
Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes no no yes yes
Cluster country-2dig-year country-2dig-year country-4dig-year country-4dig-year country-2dig-year country-2dig-year country-4dig-year country-4dig-year
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity, computed using the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (WLP).
The spillover variables measure the share of foreign output in total sectoral output at different sectoral aggregation levels in each country (country
subscripts are suppressed for brevity). Regarding sector classification, s2 refers to two-digit sector classification and s4 refers to four-digit sector
classification. In particular, Spillovers2,t =
∑
i∈s2 FOi,s,t×Yi,s,t/
∑
i∈s2 Yi,s,t where Yi,s,t refers to output of firm i, in two-digit sector s2, in country
c at time t. FOi,s,t is the percentage of firm capital owned by foreign investors. Spillover Competitions4,t =
∑
i∈s4 FOi,s,t × Yi,s,t/
∑
i∈s4 Yi,s,t
where FOi,s,t refers to the share of ownership by foreign companies in firm i, four-digit sector s4, in country c, at time t. Yi,s,t refers to output
of firm i, in four-digit sector s, in country c, at time t. Spillover Knowledges4,t refers to the output produced by foreign companies in the same
two-digit sector as the domestic firm but excluding the corresponding output produced by foreign companies operating in the same four-digit
sector. Spillover Knowledges4,t = Spillovers2,t −
∑
i∈s4 FOi,s,t × Yi,s,t/
∑
i∈s2 Yi,s,t where in the second term, the numerator refers to output
produced in the four-digit sector by foreign-owned companies and the denominator is total two-digit sectoral output. The GLS estimation
uses as weights the square root of firm mean squared predicted residuals. Results are obtained based on the sample of firms with no foreign
ownership (i.e., firms that do not have positive FO in any year of the sample). In columns (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (7) the dependent variable
and the regressands are measured at time t. Columns (4) and (8) are specifications in differences; ∆2 indicates the difference between t and
t − 2. Columns (1) to (4) focus on the sample of developed countries while columns (5) to (8) repeat the analysis for the sample of emerging
countries. Standard errors clustered at the corresponding level specified in the table are reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, denote significance
at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. See Sections 2 and 4 for details on variable construction.
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Table 4: Negative Competition Spillover Channel: Output Market Shares
Dependent Variable: Output Market Share
Sample: Total Sample of Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Second Stage Results
Developed Emerging
ESTIMATION METHOD gls gls&iv gls gls&iv
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log MS4dig log MS4dig log MS4dig log MS4dig
log FO 0.015*** 0.042** 0.116*** 0.214*
(0.004) (0.017) (0.011) (0.125)
Observations 402,137 402,137 72,349 72,349
Firms 59,306 59,306 12,758 12,758
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects N/A N/A N/A N/A
Country-Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Cluster firm . firm .
Panel B: First Stage Results
log FO log FO
log(F̂O0 ×Growth FOs,c,t−2) 66.5*** 24.91***
(2.34) (3.78)
Observations 402,137 72,349
Firms 59,306 12,758
F-Test 770.24 43.37
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the share of firm i output in total four-digit sectoral
output. log FOi,t is the log of one plus the percent share of foreign ownership in firm i capital
structure; the instrument log(F̂O0 × Growth FOs,c,t) enters the first-stage regression in the same
transformation. F̂O0 is a non-time varying measure of predicted foreign ownership of firm i, equal
to the initial level of foreign ownership of firm i. Growth FOs,c,t represents a measure correlated
with growth in foreign ownership that varies by sector s, country c and year t where firm i operates,
but not by firm. We obtain an estimate of Growth FOs,t as the residuals from the regression of
sector-level foreign industrial ownership in country c at time t, IIs,c,t, on sector-level foreign financial
ownership in country c at time t, IFs,c,t, (i.e., Growth FOs,c,t = I
I
s,c,t− bˆIFs,c,t). GLS estimation with
weights equal to the square root of firm mean squared predicted residuals. Columns (1) and (2)
refer to developed countries, while columns (3) and (4) refer to emerging countries. Standard errors
clustered at the corresponding level specified in the table are reported in parentheses. *** , **, *,
denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. See Sections 2 and 4 for details on variable construction.
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Table 5: Vertical Spillovers
Dependent Variable: Firm Productivity
Sample: Domestic Firms
(1) (2)
Developed Emerging
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log TFP log TFP
Spillover Backwards2 0.063** 0.076**
(0.023) (0.034)
Spillover Forwards2 0.027 -0.089**
(0.030) (0.038)
Spillovers2 0.014* -0.057***
(0.009) (0.013)
Observations 357,995 55,565
Firms 52,976 10,172
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Sector2dig-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Cluster country-2dig-year country-2dig-year
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity, computed using the
Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (WLP). The spillover variables account for the share
of foreign output in total sectoral output at the two-digit sectoral aggregation level in each coun-
try (country subscripts are suppressed for brevity). Spillovers2 =
∑
i∈s FOi,s,t × Yi,s,t/
∑
i∈s Yi,s,t
where FOi,s,t refers to the share of ownership by foreign-owned companies in firm i two-digit
sector s, in country c, at time t. Yi,s,t refers to output of firm i, in two-digit sector s, in
country c, at time t. Spillover Backwardj,t =
∑
kifk 6=j αjkSpilloverk,t. Spillover Forwardj,t =∑
mifm6=j σjmSpilloverm,t. GLS estimation uses weights equal to the square root of firm mean
squared predicted residuals. Results are obtained based on the sample of firms with no foreign
ownership (i.e., firms that do not have positive FO in any year of the sample). Column (1) reports
the results from the sample of developed countries while column (2) reports the results from the
emerging countries sample. Standard errors clustered at the corresponding level specified in the
table are reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. See
Sections 2 and 4 for details on variable construction.
37
Table 6: Spillovers and Domestic Firms’ Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Firm Productivity
Sample: Domestic Firms
(1) (2)
Developed Emerging
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log TFP log TFP
Spillover Competitions4 × 1st Quartile of TFP distribution -0.036** -0.157***
(0.014) (0.030)
Spillover Competitions4 × 2nd Quartile of TFP distribution -0.009 -0.094***
(0.007) (0.018)
Spillover Competitions4 × 3rd Quartile of TFP distribution -0.021** -0.060**
(0.008) (0.018)
Spillover Competitions4 × 4th Quartile of TFP distribution -0.070*** 0.008
(0.016) (0.039)
Spillover Knowledges4 × 1st Quartile of TFP distribution -0.008 0.064
(0.028) (0.046)
Spillover Knowledges4 × 2nd Quartile of TFP distribution 0.011 -0.073**
(0.013) (0.029)
Spillover Knowledges4 × 3rd Quartile of TFP distribution 0.011 -0.203***
(0.014) (0.031)
Spillover Knowledges4 × 4th Quartile of TFP distribution 0.072** -0.052
(0.031) (0.056)
Observations 350,344 58,573
Firms 52,153 10,554
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Cluster country-4dig-year country-4dig-year
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity, computed using the
Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (WLP). The spillover variables measures the share
of foreign output in total sectoral output in each country (see Table 3 for a description of
Spillover Competition and Spillover Knowledge). The 1st Quartile includes all domestic firms be-
low the 25 percentile of the initial TFP distribution of domestic firms (idem definition for the rest
of quartiles). GLS estimation uses as weights the square root of firm mean squared predicted
residuals. Results are obtained based on the sample of firms with no foreign ownership (i.e., firms
that do not have positive FO in any year of the sample). Column (1) reports the results from the
sample of developed countries while column (2) reports the results from the emerging countries
sample. Standard errors clustered at the corresponding level specified in the table are reported in
parentheses. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. See Sections 2 and 4 for details
on variable construction.
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Table 7: Spillovers and Foreign Ownership Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Firm Productivity
Sample: Domestic Firms
(1) (2)
Developed Emerging
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log TFP log TFP
Spillover Competitions4 FO > 50 -0.034*** -0.076***
(0.004) (0.011)
Spillover Competitions4 FO < 50 -0.024*** -0.056***
(0.004) (0.014)
Spillover Knowledges4 FO > 50 0.014* -0.061***
(0.007) (0.017)
Spillover Knowledges4 FO < 50 -0.008 -0.045**
(0.007) (0.017)
Observations 350,344 58,573
Firms 52,153 10,554
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Cluster country-4dig-year country-4dig-year
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity, computed using the
Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (WLP). The spillover variables measures the share
of foreign output in total sectoral output in each country (see Table 3 for a description of
Spillover Competition and Spillover Knowledge). The table differentiates between competition
spillovers from FO > 50 and FO < 50 (idem for knowledge spillovers). Spillover Competition FO >
50 =
∑
i∈s FOi,s,t× Yi,s,t× I(FO > 50)/
∑
i∈s Yi,s,t where FOi,s,t refers to the share of ownership by
foreign companies in firm i, four-digit sector s, at time t and I(FO > 50) is an indicator variable
that takes the value of one if the percentage of firm foreign ownership is greater than 50 percent
and zero otherwise. Spillover Competition FO < 50 =
∑
i∈s FOi,s,t× Yi,s,t× I(FO < 50)/
∑
i∈s Yi,s,t
where FOi,s,t refers to the share of ownership by foreign companies in firm i, four-digit sector s,
in country c at time t and I(FO < 50) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the
percentage of firm foreign ownership is greater than 0 and less or equal than 50 percent and, zero
otherwise. GLS estimation uses as weights the square root of firm mean squared predicted residuals.
Results are obtained based on the sample of firms with no foreign ownership (i.e., firms that do not
have positive FO in any year of the sample). Standard errors clustered at the corresponding level
specified in the table are reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10%
levels. See Sections 2 and 4 for details on variable construction.
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(a) Developed Countries: Foreign-owned>0. Mean (Median)
TFP of foreign-owned firms = 12.07 (12.07); Mean (Median)
TFP of domestic firms = 11.65 (11.63)
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 D
en
sit
y
5 10 15
TFP
Domestic Firms
Foreign−owned Firms
(b) Developed Countries: Foreign-owned>50. Mean (Median)
TFP of foreign-owned firms = 12.05 (12.06); Mean (Median)
TFP of domestic firms = 11.65 (11.63)
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
.
25
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 D
en
sit
y
0 20
TFP
Domestic Firms
Foreign−owned Firms
(c) Emerging Markets: Foreign-owned>0 Mean (Median) TFP
of foreign-owned firms = 10.23 (10.30); Mean (Median) TFP of
domestic firms = 9.50 (9.63)
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(d) Emerging Markets: Foreign-owned>50. Mean (Median)
TFP of foreign-owned firms = 10.26 (10.33); Mean (Median)
TFP of domestic firms = = 9.50 (9.63)
Figure 1: TFP Density Distribution by Foreign Ownership, Firms in Manufacturing
This figure plots the probability density of the logarithm of firm-level TFP (in PPP dollars 2005 base),
computed by the method of Wooldridge, Levinsohn, and Petrin. The figure shows the distribution of foreign
ownership using all manufacturing firms in all available years. The firm sample includes firms which never
had foreign owners (domestic firms) and firms with positive foreign ownership (foreign-owned firms) out
of the regression samples of firms in the manufacturing sector with available data for the main regressions
(see Data Appendix). The probability density of a given value of the log(TFP) is obtained using the non-
parametric univariate kernel density estimation. See Sections 2 and 4 for the details on construction of
variables.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION APPENDICES
Appendix: Instrument Validity and Exclusion
Consider the structural (causal) relation
(TFP) TFPi,t = αi + µc,t + φs,t + β FOi,t + ui,t ,
where all the notation is as before: FO is foreign ownership, TFP is total factor
productivity, i denotes firm, and s and c are the sector and country in which firm i
operates, respectively (suppressing s and c from firm-level variables).
We use instruments with the structure Zi,t = F̂Oi Ws,c,t, where F̂Oi is a non-time
varying measure of predicted foreign ownership of firm i and Ws,c,t is a measure that
captures the exogenous growth in foreign ownership that varies by country, sector,
and time but not by firm.
This instrument needs to be correlated with FOi,t in equation (TFP) (“relevance”)
and it needs to satisfy the exclusion restriction that it is uncorrelated with the
structural innovation term ui,t. The relevance condition is intuitive: firms with more
predicted foreign ownership increase foreign ownership faster. We argue that the
exclusion restriction is also satisfied. In the derivations that follow regarding the
exclusion restriction, we suppress the c index and the country × year fixed effects for
simpler notation. These dummies play a role parallel to that of sector × time, but
the treatment is similar and we leave those out as they would complicate notation
significantly.
We want the reduced form regression,
TFPi,t = µi + νs,t + δZi,t + wi,t ,
to give unbiased estimates of δ. For the purpose of estimating δ, this estimation
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equation, by the Frisch-Waugh theorem, is equivalent to
TFPi,t−TFPi.−TFPs,t+TFPs. = δ [F̂OiWs,t−F̂OiWs.−F̂OsWs,t+F̂Os Ws.]+(wi,t−wi.−ws,t+ws.) ,
where Xi. =
1
T Σ
T
t=1Xi,t, Xs,t =
1
Ns
ΣNsi=1Xi,t, where the summation is over all firms i in
sector s in year t, Xs. =
1
Ns
ΣNsi=1
1
T Σ
T
t=1Xi,t, etc. for any variable X.
The structural relation (TFP), demeaned, is
TFPi,t− TFPi.− TFPs,t + TFPs. = α [FOi,t− FOi.− FOst + FOs.] + (ui,t− ui.− us,t + us.)
and the reduced form regression on the instrument will be consistent if the covariance
Cov(ui,t − ui. − us,t + us., F̂OiWs,t − F̂OiWs. − F̂OsWs,t + F̂Os Ws.) = 0 .
This will be the case if
E{(ui,t − ui. − us,t + us.)F̂OiWs,t} = 0 .
Our i × (s, t) instrument will be consistent as long as the off-diagonal variation
ui,t−ui.−us,t+us. is uncorrelated with F̂Oi. This is a reasonable assumption because
the firm-average innovation ui.—which most likely would correlate with firm specific
ownership—is subtracted. We also need ui,t−ui.−us,t+us. to be uncorrelated with
Ws,t, which is again reasonable because sector averages are subtracted, and the
product of F̂Oi with Ws,t is independent of TFP innovations.
To construct the instrument, first, we choose F̂Oi to be the initial level of foreign
ownership FOi0. Second, for a time-varying measure of growth in foreign ownership,
Ws,c,t, (now making the country dependence explicit again), we construct
IIs,c,t =
∑
i∈c,t,s
FO
I
i,tYi,0/
∑
i∈c,s
Yi,0 ; (9)
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where FOIi,t is industrial ownership by foreign companies. I.e., I
I
s,c,t is sector-level
foreign industrial ownership in country c at time t. We further construct
IFs,c,t =
∑
i∈c,t,s
FO
F
i,tYi,0/
∑
i∈c,s
Yi,0 ; (10)
where FOFi,t is ownership by foreign financial companies. I.e., I
F
s,c,t is sector-level
foreign financial ownership in country c at time t.
We assume that country-sector level financial ownership is a function of current
profit opportunities in the relevant sector-country cell as they accrue to a passive
financial investor. If there is reverse causality, such that foreign financial investment
is determined by
FO
F
i,t = γ0 + γ1TFPi,t + ei,t ,
where ei,t is a noise term which aggregate to 0 in I
F by the law of large numbers,
and
FO
I
i,t = ξ0 + ξ1TFPi,t + vi,t ,
where vi,t is an innovation which is partly based on industrial owner’s return to
active management and which aggregates to Ws,c,t, then
IIs,c,t = b I
F
s,c,t + Ws,c,t + es,c,t , (11)
where Ws,c,t is the investment driven by extra future income that industrial owners
can obtain from active management (or from market power, in case of mergers—
whatever is specific to industrial ownership). If we know b, we can use IIs,c,t−b IFs,c,t =
Ws,c,t + es,c,t as an exogenous instrument because the component of country-sector
foreign ownership which is due to predicted future profits from passive investment,
and which is the source of potential reverse causality, has been subtracted.
We obtain an estimate of b by regressing II on IF and take residuals, Ws,c,t,
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which is part of our instrument; i.e.,
Ws,c,t = I
I
s,c,t − bˆ IFs,c,t (12)
For the instrument to be valid, it is essential that firm and time dummies are
included in the IV regressions because this implies that only changes relative to
average values affect the results. For this reason, we refer to this variable as sector-
level growth in foreign ownership.
E{ F̂Oi Ws,c,t (ui,t − ui. − us,t − uc,t + uc,. + us,.) } = 0 ;
i.e., whether FOi0Ws,c,t is relatively high (low) when (ui,t−ui.−us,t−uc,t+uc,.+us,.)
is relatively high (low). The endogenous component of FOi0 is ui0 so the assumption
is that
E{FOi0 Ws,c,t (ui,t − ui. − us,t − uc,t + uc,. + us,.) } = 0 .
We have assumed that W is independent of u after controlling for country and sector
fixed effects, so this simplifies to
E{Ws,c,t}E{FOi0 (ui,t − ui. − us,t − uc,t + uc,. + us,.) } = 0 .
Because FOi0 may be a function of initial productivity, this basically is the assump-
tion that E{ui0 (ui,t − ui.) } = 0 so the main identifying assumption then is that
the initial firm productivity level doesn’t not predict firm-level passive productivity
growth.
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Appendix: Data
Sample Selection
We construct a unique data set of firm-level observations from the comprehensive
database ORBIS, which covers around 100 million listed and private companies
around the world. In this study, we focus on European companies (roughly a half of
the entire ORBIS universe).37 The European subset of ORBIS includes 40 countries
with varying coverage. It totals some 50 million companies: public and private,
large, medium, and small, with about 10 thousand listed companies. A company
with subsidiaries is required to prepare consolidated accounts; however, we use only
unconsolidated accounts to avoid double counting.38
The literature typically cleans the raw data. This appendix demonstrates the
cleaning process in two major steps:
1. Cleaning which is necessary for any project linking firm ownership with firm
outcomes (we refer to this as “general cleaning”).
2. Further cleaning pertaining to this project (we refer to this as “project-specific
cleaning”).
37For marketing purposes, the BvD packages this data in a separate database, AMADEUS, which
has a very similar structure to ORBIS.
38Even though the number of consolidated accounts is less than 1 percent of all accounts, it is
important to use just the unconsolidated accounts. ORBIS categorizes all companies as subsidiaries
regardless of the percentage of ownership: In standard accounting, a company A will be classified
as a subsidiary of a company B if company B owns more than 50 percent of company A, while in
ORBIS company A will be called a subsidiary even company B owns a 1 percent stake. There can be
direct subsidiaries and also indirect subsidiaries. For example, BMW has 186 recorded subsidiaries,
54 of which are outside Europe (like BMW United States) and hence not in our data set. 77 out
of the remaining 132 are direct subsidiaries while the remaining 55 companies are subsidiaries of
these. Another example is LEGO, which has 38 subsidiaries of which 3 are directly owned—the
remainder are subsidiaries of these. By using unconsolidated accounts, outcomes do not include
the outcome of parents and subsidiaries. By looking at the consolidated accounts of the 3 direct
subsidiaries, we verified that the sum of sales and employment of the indirect subsidiaries is less
than the numbers reported in the consolidated accounts of the 3 direct subsidiaries. (It will not be
an exact match because we do not have data for subsidiaries outside Europe).
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General Cleaning
We focus on companies of a certain minimum size, discarding the companies defined
by ORBIS as “small” (operating revenue less than EUR1 million; total assets less
than EUR2 million, or number of employees less than 10). The data coverage is
limited at the beginning of the period and for some countries; due to the limited
coverage before mid-1990s and delays with reporting the data coverage for meaning-
ful analysis, we focus on 1996–2008. We have information for 40 European countries
and 1.8 million of unique firms for the period 1996–2008 of which many have missing
outcomes and/or assets.
The main financial variables used in the analysis are total assets, operating
revenue, tangible fixed assets, and expenditure on materials and employment. We
convert all financial data into “2005 PPP dollars” using yearly GDP deflators with
2005 base from the World Bank and 2005 end-of-year US dollar exchange rates. The
“$” sign will represent 2005 PPP dollars in the following. Employment is measured
in number of persons.
We drop all firms with assets less than $1,000 in any year, employment negative
or larger than 2 million (the employment of Walmart), negative sales, or negative
operating revenue. As the result, we have 1.76 million firms. We drop firms that do
not have ownership information and obtain a sample for 40 European countries and
1.42 million unique firms (See below for details of ownership variables calculation).
Our firms represent a wide range of industries. The classification of 2 digit
NACE Revision 2, Level 2 industries is presented in Table A-3. We drop certain
industries: electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (NACE codes 35xx);
water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (NACE codes
36xx–39xx); financial and insurance services (NACE codes 41xx–43xx); real estate
(NACE codes 68xx); public administration and defense (NACE codes 84xx); and
activities of extraterritorial organizations (NACE codes 99xx), leaving 1.23 million
firms.
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Next, we drop firms with gaps in the data. For example, if a firm reports data for
2001–2004, not in 2005, and then in 2006, the 2006 data is eliminated from analysis.
After dropping 203,409 gaps we still have 1.23 million firms but fewer time series
observations.
For the construction of our regression variables, we need non-missing data for
certain financial variables. We drop firms with zero or missing employment, oper-
ating revenue, total assets, or negative “costs of materials” and are left with 907
thousand firms.
Visual inspection reveals errors in the data. For example, some numbers seem
to be incorrectly coded in dollars rather than in millions of dollars, and to alleviate
outliers due to typing mistakes, we eliminate firms below the 0.1th percentile and
above the 99.9th percentile in the distribution of sales to assets, operating revenue
to assets, operating revenue to sales, employment to assets, employment to sales,
employment to operating revenue, operating revenue less material costs (“value
added” computed by us) to operating revenue, and operating revenue less material
costs to employment in any year. For the ratio of revenue to sales, we drop firms
above the 95th percentile in order to eliminate firms with high financial income
(included in operating revenue but not in sales numbers). Although we drop all
firms classified as financial companies by ORBIS, many non-financial companies
have significant investment income and our cleaning is intended to remove such
firms. An extreme example is Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, which started
as a textile firm and became an investment company over time. We also eliminate
firms with sales larger than operating revenue. These filters also get rid of most
phantom firms, tax-fronts, etc. The resulting sample covers 788 thousand unique
firms from 38 European countries over 1996–2008.
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Project-Specific Cleaning
Data coverage, in particular sectoral information, is limited at the beginning of the
sample and for some countries. Therefore, we use a sample of 15 developed countries
and 15 emerging countries over 1999–2008 with approximately 740 thousand firms.
We concentrate on the sample of firms with more than 15 employees and known
sector information (at 2- and 4-digit level of the NACE industry classification Revi-
sion 2 in Table A-3). This step eliminates roughly half of the cleaned sample bringing
it down to 15 developed countries and 15 emerging countries, over 1999–2008, with
approximately 336 thousand firms. The data counts by country are presented in
panel A of Appendix Table A-2.
In order to compute total factor productivity (TFP) at the firm level, we need data
on output, employment, physical capital and cost of materials. Unfortunately, firms
in some countries are not obliged to report expenditure on materials; furthermore,
some firms do not report data on total fixed assets. This limits our sample to 208,400
firms from 12 developed and 13 emerging countries (“Firms with Available Data for
TFP Construction”). The data counts by country in this sample are presented in
panel B of Appendix Table A-2.
If we focus on the manufacturing sector only (to compare our findings to previous
results in the literature). The comparison of descriptive statistics of the key variables
shows that this manufacturing firms sample is representative of the larger sample of
all sectors. Focusing on manufacturing, we are left with 134,000 firms.39
TFP Estimation
This appendix explains the details of the firm-level productivity estimation per-
formed using the method of Wooldridge, Levinsohn and Petrin, as suggested by
39See Appendix for NACE 2 sector classification. Manufacturing sectors are sectors 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. We drop sector 19
“Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products” since there are not enough observations per
country to estimate TFP.
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Olley and Pakes. (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and further augmented
by Wooldridge (2009). Olley and Pakes. (1996) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) (LP) propose to use proxy variables to control for unobserved productiv-
ity. The estimation in both methods is based on a two-step procedure to achieve
consistency of the coefficient estimates for the inputs of the production function.
Wooldridge (2009) suggests a generalized method of moments estimation of TFP
to overcome some limitations of OP and LP, including correction for simultaneous
determination of inputs and productivity, no need to maintain constant returns to
scale, and robustness to the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2008) critique.40 The
following discussion is based on Wooldridge (2009), accommodated to the case of
a production functions with two production inputs (see Wooldridge (2009) for a
general discussion).
For firm i in time period t define:
yit = α+ βllit + βkkit + ωit + eit , (13)
where yit, lit, and kit denote the natural logarithm of firm value added, labor (a
variable input), and capital, respectively. The firm specific error can be decomposed
into a term capturing firm specific productivity ωit and an additional term that
reflects measurement error or unexpected productivity shocks eit. We are interested
in estimating ωit.
A key assumption of the OP and LP estimation methods is that for some function
g(., .):
ωit = g(kit,mit) , (14)
where mit is a proxy variable (for investment in OP, for intermediate inputs in LP).
40Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2008) highlight that if the variable input (labor) is chosen prior
to the time when production takes place, the coefficient on variable input is not identified.
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Under the assumption,
E(eit|lit, kit,mit) = 0 t = 1, 2, ..., T , (15)
substituting equation (14) into equation (13), we have the following regression func-
tion:
E(yit|lit, kit,mit) = α+ βllit + βkkit + g(kit,mit) (16)
≡ βllit + h(kit,mit) ,
where h(kit,mit) ≡ α+ βkkit + g(kit,mit).
In order to identify βl and βk, we need some additional assumptions. First,
rewrite equation (15) in a form allowing for more lags :
E(eit|lit, kit,mit, li,t−1, ki,t−1,mi,t−1, ..., li1, ki1,mi1) = 0 t = 1, 2, ..., T . (17)
Second, assume productivity follows a first-order Markov process:
E(ωit|ωi,t−1, ..., ωi1) = E(ωit|ωi,t−1) t = 2, 3, ..., T, (18)
and assume that the productivity innovation ait ≡ ωit−E(ωit|ωi,t−1) is uncorrelated
with current values of the state variable kit as well as past values of the variable
input l, the state k, and the proxy variables m:
E(ωit|kit, li,t−1, ki,t−1,mi,t−1, ..., li1, ki1,mi1) (19)
= E(ωit|ωi,t−1) ≡ f [g(ki,t−1,mi,t−1)] .
Recall from equation(14) that ωi,t−1 = g(ki,t−1,mi,t−1).
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Plugging ωi,t = f [g(ki,t−1,mi,t−1)] + ait into equation (13) gives:
yit = α+ βllit + βkkit + f [g(ki,t−1,mi,t−1)] + ait + eit . (20)
Now it is possible to specify two equations which identify (βl, βk):
yit = α+ βllit + βkkit + g(ki,t,mi,t) + eit (21)
and
yit = α+ βllit + βkkit + f [g(ki,t−1,mi,t−1)] + uit , (22)
where uit ≡ ait + eit.
Important for the GMM estimation strategy, the available orthogonality con-
ditions differ across these two equations. The orthogonality conditions for equa-
tion (21) are those outlined in the equation(17), while the orthogonality conditions
for equation (22) are
E(uit|kit, li,t−1, ki,t−1,mi,t−1, ..., li1, ki1,mi1) = 0 t = 2, ..., T . (23)
To proceed with the estimation, we estimate these equations parametrically. In
that, we follow Petrin, Reiter, and White (2011) and use a third-degree polynomial
approximation using first order lags of variable input as instruments.41
Details of Foreign Ownership Calculations
To construct time and firm-specific foreign ownership variables we use two sep-
arate datasets available from the BvD: the Ownership section of ORBIS dataset
with “static” ownership breakdown for a given firm at year-end, and the global
Zephyr dataset containing information about changes in ownership due to M&A.
The ORBIS-Ownership database contains detailed information on owners of both
41We use the Stata routine suggested in Petrin, Reiter, and White (2011).
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listed and private firms including name, country of residence, and type (e.g., bank,
industrial company, fund, individual, and so on). The global Zephyr database from
the BvD which contains “deal records;” i.e., in each M&A, the target, the acquiring
party or parties, the dates when the deal was announced and completed, and the
type of the deal (e.g., Acquisition, Acquisition of 15%, Merger, Joint Venture, etc.).
Direct ownership and Ultimate ownership
A unit of observation in the Ownership section of ORBIS is the ownership link
indicating that an entity A owns a certain percentage of firm B, which is referred
as a “direct” ownership link. In addition, ORBIS contains information on-so called
“ultimate” owners (UO) of the company by tracing the ownership pyramid beyond
the direct owners. To find UOs of a company, BvD focuses on identifying the owners,
if any, who exercise a greater degree of control over the company.
We prefer direct ownership because of the following considerations. First, most
UO links are calculated by BvD but not reported by the original sources whereas
the direct ownership links are taken from the direct sources and not altered by
BvD. to identify UOs, BvD focuses on targets where at least one owner has more
than 25 percent of direct ownership. For each such entity, BvD looks for the owner
with the highest direct ownership stake. If this shareholder is “independent” (being
owned less than 25 percent by any of its owners), it is defined as the UO of the
company. If the shareholder with the largest ownership share is not independent,
the process is repeated until BvD finds the UO. BvD admits that “even if the scope
of the BvD ownership database is very wide, BvD cannot absolutely assert that all
the existing links are recorded in the database. More importantly, because certain
ownership structures can be very complex, trying to evaluate a controlling ultimate
owner could be misleading” (Bureau van Dijk (2010)). Second, it is not possible to
compute a satisfactory continuous ownership variable over time from the ultimate
ownership links, exactly because of the uncertainty associated with construction
of this variable. In contrast, large owners are almost always precisely identified
52
from our direct ownership variable. Finally, because the process of identifying the
ultimate owner only uses the largest owners, foreign owners with stakes smaller than
25 percent are ignored, which leads to an incorrect classification of “foreign-owned”
firms; we find that many foreign owners in our sample hold stakes that are smaller
than 25 percent but not negligible.
Type-specific ownership.
The database refers to each record of ownership as an “ownership link” and
BvD traces a link between two entities even when the ownership percentage is very
small (sometimes less than 1 percent). For listed firms, very small stock holders are
typically unknown.42 An ownership link indicating that an entity A owns a certain
percentage of firm B is referred to in ORBIS as a “direct” ownership link. We recode
the the categorical variables indication direct ownership percentages into numeric
format replacing special character values according to the usual GAAP practice as
follows: replace special code ”WO” (wholly owned) with 100%; replace special code
”MO” (majority owned) with 51%; replace code ”CQP1” (50% plus 1 share) with
50%.
The database contains a variable for country of residence of owners. If the
owner’s country is not the same as the country of the firm, the link is identified as
foreign. Often the owner country is missing. In such cases, the researchers who work
with BvD data typically assume that the owner is located in the same country as
the given company. To improve on this procedure, we inspect the variable “owner
name.” When possible, we manually categorize the owner as foreign if the owner’s
name suggest so. The remaining (typically small) owners of unknown origin are
42Countries have different rules for when the identity of a minority owner needs to be disclosed;
for example, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden demand that listed firms disclose all
owners with more than a five percent stake, while disclosure is required at three percent in the UK,
and at two percent in Italy. See Siems and Schouten (2009). Information regarding US companies
taken from the SEC Edgar Filings and the NASDAQ, however, stops at 1 percent (Bureau van
Dijk (2010)) BvD collects its ownership data from the official registers (including SEC filings and
stock exchanges), annual reports, private correspondence, telephone research, company websites,
and news wires.
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assigned to the home country.
Next, we identify foreign links corresponding to a specific “owner type” using the
available type of owner variable. The values of this variable is textual but sufficiently
harmonized. Specifically, we identify foreign ownership link of industrial type if the
foreign owner has the type “industrial company” or “corporate.” We identify foreign
ownership link of financial type if the foreign owner has the type “bank,” “financial
company,” “insurance company,” “mutual & pension fund/trust/nominee,” “other
financial institution,” “pension/mutual fund,” “private equity firms,” or “Sticht-
ing.”43,44
Having identified foreign ownership links of a given type, we compute Foreign
Ownership (FO) variable as follows: For a firm i, FOi,t is the sum of all percentages
of direct ownership by foreigners in year t; FOFi,t (FO
I
i,t) is the sum of all percentages
of direct ownership by foreigners of financial (industrial) type. For example, if a
company A has three foreign owners with stakes 10 percent, 15 percent, and 35
percent; respectively, FO for this company is 60 percent. If the second owner is a
bank, and the first and the third owner are industrial, the FOFi,t is 15% and (FO
I
i,t)
is 45%. The missing ownership percentage is set to zero, even though the link is
preserved for other purposes (such as, for example, count of the number of owners).
Finally, we round FO values to a 100th of a percent and clean the resulting year
and firm-specific ownership data for erroneous values due to obvious mistakes. We
encountered relatively few cases of those. We drop a few firms where the com-
puted total ownership (foreign and domestic) is larger than 102%. We replace
FO ⊂ [100, 102) by 100%.
43For observations before 2001, the only owner type values available are “corporate” and “in-
dividual.” The finer division starts in 2002 but no “industrial company” value is available; both
“corporate” and “industrial company” co-exist from 2004-on. We assign the ”corporate” to be
industrial type, because it is otherwise impossible to determine the type of a given owner.
44The other types of the owners could be “government,” public (for listed companies), or “other”
for non-classified owners such as autocontrol, self-owned, employees/managers, individual, individ-
ual(s) or family(ies), personnel, employees, private individuals/private shareholders, foundation,
foundation/research institute, unnamed private shareholders aggregated, miscellaneous, undefined
company, unknown, n.a., or simply missing.
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Filling-in missing ownership information.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Volosovych (2010) provide detailed examples demon-
strating that for the years we observe the ownership data from the ORBIS-Ownership
dataset includes all the information in the Zephyr database of Mergers and Acqui-
sitions and adds to this because foreign ownership can change over time due to
other reasons then M&As. The examples demonstrate that ownership information
in Zephyr is clearly reflected in our FO variables, but there are companies that had
changes in FO based on the ORBIS-Ownership dataset which do not appear in
Zephyr.
We have access to the ORBIS-Ownership dataset only at a biannual frequency for
the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008. We use the change in ownership information
from Zephyr to fill-in the gaps in the time series and to extend it to the earlier years.
The Zephyr data can easily be matched with the ORBIS-Ownership because a BvD
company identifier is included in both databases. We keep Zephyr deals in which
both the BvD ID of the target and the acquiror are non-missing. Each deal comes
with information about the stake acquired during this transaction and we need to
turn all possible information into numeric values. For the cases in which the acquired
stake is codified as unknown, we infer this value from non-missing information of
the initial and final stakes, if possible, and otherwise drop the observation.
In the next step, we clean the date variables. Zephyr includes a number of date
variables showing when the deal took place (e.g., date announced, date completed,
etc.). We drop observations for which no information on the date of the deal is
provided. If there are multiple non-missing dates, we use the date when the deal
was completed.
In the following step, we generate variables equivalent to the ones that had been
created for ORBIS-Ownership. That is, we identify foreign links corresponding to
a specific “owner type” using the available type of owner variable (e.g., industrial
versus financial foreign ownership). There are cases in which a target company
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has multiple ownership changes within the same year and the same acquiror. In
this case, we keep the largest stake for a given acquiror and target in a given year.
Therefore, after this step our Zephyr dataset is uniquely identified at the target-
acquiror-year level. Finally, we collapse the data at the target-year level, thereby
adding up all the foreign ownership stakes for each foreign nationality-type.
Once we have obtained the clean version of our Zephyr dataset for each target
firm-year cell, we merge it with the ORBIS-Ownership database. In order to obtain
the best match, in a sense of filling-in the missing gaps in the ORBIS-Ownership
dataset without overwriting with potentially incorrect data from Zephyr, we adopt
the following procedure. First, we generate a balanced panel for the ORBIS-
Ownership database for the years 2000–2010. Next, we merge this balanced panel
with our cleaned version of the Zephyr dataset using the unique BvD ID identifiers
that are present in both datasets. Given that our primary ownership information is
from the ORBIS-Ownership dataset, we give priority to this dataset. Among other
things, we do not replace non-missing ORBIS-Ownership information with Zephyr
information. In other words, we only add ownership from Zephyr when the cor-
responding ownership information is missing in ORBIS-Ownership. With respect
to filling-in the missing gaps in the data, gaps can be present in initial years, final
years, or years in between. For gaps in initial (final) years of ownership, we assume
that the ownership is the same as in the first (last) observation with non-missing
data. For missing observations in periods between the first and last non-missing pe-
riods, we replace the missing values with the non-missing observations of the earlier
periods. The underlying assumption is that if a no transaction has been included in
Zephyr, then there was no ownership change.
The resulting combined ownership dataset is merged with financial data.
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Descriptive Statistics
Table A-4 reports descriptive statistics. The samples include firms in the manu-
facturing sector with available data for the regression analysis. “Domestic Firms”
do not have foreign owners in any year.45 On average, firms in developed countries
are more productive than firms in emerging countries regardless of measure. With
respect to output and employment market shares at the 2- and 4-digit level, we
observe much higher concentration in emerging markets, especially at the 4-digit
level, suggesting a less competitive market environment there. FO and industrial FO
is somewhat larger for emerging-country firms. Financial FO shares are very small
in both samples and their variation is lower. Sub-panels 2 and 3 of Table A-4 report
features of the spillover variables in the sub-samples of purely domestic firms in
developed and emerging countries. The general pattern is of somewhat larger values
of all measures of spillovers in emerging markets.
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Table A-1: Firm Coverage in Manufacturing: 2002–2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Firms Firms Firms Firms with
with GUO with FO Financial Data
in Every Year
Our sample
1 UA 39952 451 628 18931
2 SK 3376 79 508 301
3 SI 3457 36 129 1510
4 SE 21159 1421 452 15236
5 RU 57259 1934 1330 69
6 RS 16642 64 505 6820
7 RO 49597 105 3885 14084
8 PT 33242 237 202 77
9 PL 11393 291 1542 2706
10 NO 6696 52 163 28
11 NL 1919 143 298 434
12 LV 2276 26 118 329
13 LT 2393 11 170 471
14 IT 116 15 3 84
15 HU 13029 29 245 587
16 HR 7650 90 178 4334
17 GR 4682 66 38 3484
18 GB 12828 487 2046 5670
19 FR 88854 1158 1975 56140
20 FI 10150 323 318 2999
21 ES 82059 1183 1169 43639
22 EE 4262 14 534 1882
23 DK 1600 69 174 64
24 DE 14384 382 1193 568
25 CZ 13234 305 1763 3160
26 CH 163 56 15 95
27 BG 7574 80 611 1422
28 BE 8804 420 678 3193
29 BA 2677 26 100 1019
30 AT 1610 46 213 81
Sum 523037 9599 21183 188620
Additional Countries with Problematic TFP Coverage
1 US 6230 1554 190 1566
2 KR 37446 153 215 8845
3 JP 27577 1527 128 10727
4 CN 181906 776 1952 60504
Sum 253159 4010 2485 81642
Additional Countries with Problematic Firm Coverage
1 ZA 70 19 5 3
2 TW 1225 893 3 23
3 TR 78 3 5 .
4 TN 3 . . .
5 NZ 13 3 . 2
6 MY 919 144 139 54
7 MX 1278 44 277 .
8 MK 355 11 10 .
9 MA 6 . . .
10 KZ 12 2 3 2
11 IS 336 12 7 5
12 IN 213 15 13 3
13 IL 196 45 14 6
14 IE 586 89 174 15
15 ID 213 5 55 12
16 HK 55 12 13 7
17 EG 38 . 4 .
18 CO 409 13 10 17
19 CL 53 2 3 .
20 CA 10 3 3 .
21 BR 1926 65 366 .
22 BM 268 46 226 41
23 AU 593 239 165 19
24 AR 691 28 168 2
25 AE 11 4 . .
Sum 9557 1697 1663 393
Notes: The table presents number of firms from ORBIS with some financial data from selected countries. Countries:
Algeria (DZ), Argentina (AR), Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belarus (BY), Belgium (BE), Bermuda (BM), Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BA)a, Brazil (BR), Bulgaria (BG), Canada (CA), Chile (CL), China (CN), Colombia (CO), Croatia (HR),
Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Egypt (EG), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR),
Hong Kong (HK), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Ireland (IE), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Japan (JP),
Kazakhstan (KZ), Korea Republic of (KR), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Macedonia (MK), Malaysia (MY), Mexico (MX),
Morocco (MA), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Russian
Federation (RU), Serbia (RS), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), South Africa (ZA), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH),
Taiwan (TW), Tunisia (TN), Turkey (TR), Ukraine (UA), United Arab Emirates (AE), United Kingdom (GB), United States
of America (US). Financial Data: All companies with a known value of 1) Operating revenue; and 2) Total assets; and 3)
Number of employees in at least one of the selected periods 2002–2007. GUO is Global Ultimate Owner, FO is foreign
owned in any amount larger than zero percent .
Table A-2: Number of Observations per Country
Panel A: Total Number of Firms
Developed Emerging
Country Obs. Number Average Firms per Country Obs. Number Average Firms per
Firms Time mill. Pop Firms Time mill. Pop
AUSTRIA 2,140 1,142 1.87 140 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1,536 228 6.74 61
BELGIUM 67,674 9,642 7.02 922 BULGARIA 22,236 3,564 6.24 457
DENMARK 11,403 2,997 3.80 554 CROATIA 19,628 2,169 9.05 489
FINLAND 37,219 5,019 7.42 958 CZECH REPUBLIC 60,444 10,322 5.86 1,004
FRANCE 357,607 56,600 6.32 935 ESTONIA 17,705 2,213 8.00 1,637
GERMANY 41,067 14,880 2.76 181 HUNGARY 4,997 2,128 2.35 210
GREECE 66,763 7,567 8.82 684 LATVIA 10,913 1,480 7.37 431
ITALY 230,802 34,447 6.70 592 LITHUANIA 10,996 1,872 5.87 809
NETHERLANDS 8,671 2,077 4.17 128 POLAND 83,085 12,669 6.56 331
NORWAY 54,058 7,155 7.56 1,552 ROMANIA 34,407 4,097 8.40 188
PORTUGAL 18,484 6,864 2.69 656 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 244,018 57,474 4.25 399
SPAIN 331,651 42,345 7.83 990 SERBIA 22,421 2,855 7.85 383
SWEDEN 80,424 9,185 8.76 1,019 SLOVAKIA 9,547 1,938 4.93 360
SWITZERLAND 1,712 255 6.71 34 SLOVENIA 10,516 1,797 5.85 898
UNITED KINGDOM 179,929 26,864 6.70 448 UKRAINE 27,207 3,709 7.34 78
TOTAL 1,489,604 227,039 6.56 – TOTAL 579,656 108,515 5.34 –
Panel B: Number of Firms with Available Data for TFP Construction
Developed Emerging
Country Obs. Number Average Firms per Country Obs. Number Average Firms per
Firms Time mill. Pop Firms Time mill. Pop
AUSTRIA 1415 871 1.62 107 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1521 226 6.73 60
BELGIUM 49093 6581 7.46 630 BULGARIA 21054 3432 6.13 440
DENMARK – – – – CROATIA 19027 2123 8.96 479
FINLAND 34162 4673 7.31 892 CZECH REPUBLIC 36074 7660 4.71 745
FRANCE 325609 51953 6.27 858 ESTONIA 14766 2040 7.24 1509
GERMANY 38349 13985 2.74 170 HUNGARY 4855 2089 2.32 206
GREECE – – – – LATVIA 301 53 5.68 15
ITALY 225524 33675 6.70 578 LITHUANIA – – – –
NETHERLANDS 419 75 5.59 5 POLAND 61647 11051 5.58 289
NORWAY 16374 2108 7.77 457 ROMANIA 33991 4029 8.44 185
PORTUGAL 12070 4787 2.52 458 RUSSIAN FEDERATION – – – –
SPAIN 315079 40346 7.81 943 SERBIA 22306 2836 7.87 381
SWEDEN 46666 6436 7.25 714 SLOVAKIA 7857 1841 4.27 342
SWITZERLAND 498 75 6.64 10 SLOVENIA 10350 1778 5.82 888
UNITED KINGDOM – – – – UKRAINE 26720 3672 7.28 77
TOTAL 1065258 165565 6.43 – TOTAL 260469 42830 6.08 –
Notes: Panel A reports on firms with reliable data for output, employment, ownership, with varying
coverage over 1999–2008, as well as, sectoral information. We focus on firms with more than 15
employees and total assets over $1000, 2005 base. Firms in Panel B have data for computing TFP.
See Data Appendix for more details on sample selection. Firms per mill. Pop reports the average
number of firms per capita in millions (average population over bi-annual intervals from 2000 to
2008 from the World Bank.
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Table A-3: (Appendix Table 2) NACE Revision 2, Level 2 Classification.
Code Name of the Level 2 NACE sector
01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
02 Forestry and logging
03 Fishing and aquaculture
05 Mining of coal and lignite
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
07 Mining of metal ores
08 Other mining and quarrying
09 Mining support service activities
10 Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture, etc.
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services
41 Construction of buildings
42 Civil engineering
43 Specialised construction activities
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
50 Water transport
51 Air transport
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
53 Postal and courier activities
55 Accommodation
56 Food and beverage service activities
58 Publishing activities
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing
60 Programming and broadcasting activities
61 Telecommunications
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
63 Information service activities
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
68 Real estate activities
69 Legal and accounting activities
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific research and development
73 Advertising and market research
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities
75 Veterinary activities
77 Rental and leasing activities
78 Employment activities
79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities
80 Security and investigation activities
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
85 Education
86 Human health activities
87 Residential care activities
88 Social work activities without accommodation
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities
91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities
92 Gambling and betting activities
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
94 Activities of membership organizations
95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods
96 Other personal service activities
97 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel
98 Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private households for own use
99 Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
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Table A-4: Summary Statistics, Firms in Manufacturing
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Developed Countries
A-1: All Firms (402,137 obs., 59,306 firms)
log VA/L 11.42 11.43 0.53 7.26 12.91
log TFP 11.70 11.67 0.72 3.81 15.48
MS2dig Output 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.84
MS2dig Empl 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00004 0.67
MS4dig Output 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00001 0.96
MS4dig Empl 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00005 0.93
FO 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
Industrial FO 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00
Financial FO 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
A-2: Domestic Firms (350,344 obs., 52,153 firms)
Spillovers2 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.88
Spillover Competitions4 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.98
Spillover Knowledges4 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.88
A-3: Domestic Firms (357,995 obs., 52,976 firms)
Spillovers2 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.88
Spillover Backwards2 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.57
Spillover Forwards2 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.007 0.33
Panel B: Emerging Countries
B-1: All Firms (72,349 obs., 12,758 firms)
log VA/L 9.68 9.70 0.98 7.19 12.89
log TFP 9.58 9.70 1.89 3.23 20.94
MS2dig Output 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00001 0.77
MS2dig Empl 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00008 0.73
MS4dig Output 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.00010 0.92
MS4dig Empl 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.0005 0.85
FO 0.07 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00
Industrial FO 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Financial FO 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
B-2: Domestic Firms (58,573 obs., 10,554 firms)
Spillovers2 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.94
Spillover Competitions4 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.96
Spillover Knowledges4 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.82
B-3: Domestic Firms (55,565 obs., 10,172 firms)
Spillovers2 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.94
Spillover Backwards2 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.64
Spillover Forwards2 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.56
Notes: Statistics drawn from the regression samples of firms in the manufacturing sector with available data
for the main regressions (see Data Appendix). Domestic firms refers to firms that did not have foreign owners
in any year. log VA/L is firm value added, defined as the difference between operating revenue and expendi-
ture on materials in PPP $ 2005 base, divided by firm employment. log TFP is the natural logarithm of total
factor productivity, computed following Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin (WLP). Industrial FO, Financial FO,
and FO refer to the share of firm’s voting equity owned by, correspondingly, industrial, financial, and all
foreign owners. MS2dig Output (MS2dig Empl) is the firm’s output (employment) market share in total output
(employment) of the 2 (4)-digit sector of the firm, by country and year. The spillover variables measure the
share of foreign output in total sectoral output in a country (country subscripts are suppressed for brevity).
In particular, Spillovers2,t =
∑
i∈s2 FOi,s,t × Yi,t/
∑
i∈s2 Yi,s,t where s2 refers to the 2-digit sector classifi-
cation and FOi,s,t indicates the share of foreign ownership of firm i (country subscripts are suppressed for
brevity throughout). Spillover Competitions4,t =
∑
i∈s4 FOi,s,t×Yi,s,t/
∑
i∈s4 Yi,s,t, where s4 refers to the
four-digit sector classification. Spillover Knowledges4,t = Spillovers2,t−
∑
i∈s4 FOi,s,t×Yi,s,t/
∑
i∈s2 Yi,s,t.
The knowledge spillover variable captures foreign presence in the same 2-digit sector, excluding output pro-
duced by foreign-owned companies in the same 4-digit sector. Spillover Backwardj,t is a measure of foreign
presence in industries being supplied by sector j and equals
∑
k 6=j αjkSpilloverk2,t, where αsk is the pro-
portion of sector j output supplied to sector k. Spillover Forwardj,t is a measure of foreign presence in
upstream sectors and it equals
∑
m 6=j σjmSpilloverm2,t, where σjm is the share of inputs purchased by
industry j from industry m in total inputs sourced by sector j. See Table A-3 for industry classifications
and Sections 2 and 4 for details on construction of variables.
Table A-5: Summary Statistics: Time Variation in Foreign Ownership and Produc-
tivity, Firms in Manufacturing
Developed Countries Emerging Countries
year Obs. Firms Average Average Obs. Firms Average Average
FO log TFP FO log TFP
1998 170,476 197,591 3.43 11.80 14,343 1,617 2.47 9.37
1999 296,939 347,943 3.77 11.72 30,505 4,105 3.42 9.45
2000 328,047 390,350 3.67 11.71 37,782 5,144 3.22 9.41
2001 338,490 398,481 3.85 11.69 50,246 7,071 3.95 9.33
2002 349,600 417,012 4.09 11.67 55,184 7,557 6.13 9.45
2003 340,860 404,638 4.37 11.66 59,600 8,430 6.36 9.55
2004 334,435 400,838 5.53 11.71 61,844 9,073 7.66 9.63
2005 337,994 415,462 5.84 11.72 61,882 9,341 7.79 9.66
2006 348,517 471,152 5.73 11.71 63,947 10,128 8.85 9.74
2007 338,385 448,919 5.87 11.73 57,012 8,787 8.66 9.76
2008 93,282 129,025 5.95 11.63 7,486 1,096 10.93 9.69
Notes: Counts of observations and averages over firms by year for the variables indicated in the column
headings. Observations are from the regression samples of firms in the manufacturing sector with available
data for the regressors (see Data Appendix). log TFP is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity,
computed following Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin. FO refers to the percentage share of firm’s voting equity
owned by industrial and financial foreign owners. See Table A-3 for industry classifications and Sections 2
and 4 for details on data construction.
Table A-6: Foreign Activity and Labor Productivity, Preliminary Explorations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firms All All Manuf. Manuf. All All Manuf. Manuf.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(Y/L) log(VA/L) log(VA/L) log(VA/L) log(VA/L)
FO 0.518*** 0.027*** 0.622*** 0.037*** 0.552*** -0.018*** 0.494*** 0.002
(0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
Firm Fixed Effects no yes no yes no yes no yes
Sector Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 4,288,260 4,288,260 1,104,777 1,104,777 3,091,452 3,091,452 872,039 872,039
Note: All refers to the full sample while Manuf. refers to the manufacturing sample. Y refers to
operating revenue, L is the number of employees, VA is value-added computed as the difference
between operating revenue and cost of materials. FO is the log of one plus the percent share of
foreign ownership in firm i capital structure.
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Table A-7: Spillovers and Selection through Entry/Exit
Dependent Variable: Firm Productivity
Sample: Domestic Firms
Panel: Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Developed Emerging
DEPENDENT VARIABLE log TFP log TFP log TFP log TFP
Spillover Competitions4 -0.029*** -0.080**
(0.006) (0.027)
Spillover Knowledges4 0.023** -0.020
(0.011) (0.042)
Spillover Competitions4 FO> 50 -0.035*** -0.081**
(0.006) (0.026)
Spillover Competitions4 FO< 50 -0.025*** -0.016
(0.006) (0.037)
Spillover Knowledges4 FO> 50 0.017 -0.011
(0.011) (0.040)
Spillover Knowledges4 FO< 50 -0.008 -0.085
(0.010) (0.056)
Observations 160,040 160,040 17,360 17,360
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Country-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Sector4dig-Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Cluster country-4dig-year country-4dig-year country-4dig-year country-4dig-year
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of total factor productivity which is computed following
Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (WLP). The spillover variables distinguish between Com-
petition and Knowledge constructed at the four-digit sector in each country. See Table 3 for a
description of Spillover Competitions4 and Spillover Knowledges4. See Table 7 for a description of
Spillover Competitions4 FO > 50 and Spillover Knowledges4 FO > 50. Estimation performed by Gener-
alized Least Squares (GLS) where weights are the square root of the firm mean squared predicted residuals.
Results are obtained based on the sample of firms with no foreign ownership (i.e., firms that were never
acquired (in any percentage) by a foreign-owned investor over the period of analysis). Results are based on
a permanent sample of firms (i.e., firms that we observe from 2000 to 2007 in our sample).Standard errors
clustered at the corresponding level specified in the table are reported in parentheses. *** , **, *, denote
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% levels. See Sections 2 and 4 for the details on construction of variables.
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Figure A-1: Sectoral Distribution of Firms
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of all firms in all available years in a given industry. Agric-
Mining refers to Agriculture and Mining and corresponds to NACE 2 digit sector classification: 01,
02, 03, 05, 06, 07, 08, 09. Manufacturing: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. Construction: 41, 42, 43. Services: 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93,
94, 95, 96. Retail: 45, 46, 47. See Table A-3 for the industry classification and Sections 2 and 4 for
the details on construction of variables. Firms are drawn from the sample with available data for
TFP construction (panel B of Table A-2).
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